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TAXING POLYGAMY 
SAMUEL D. BRUNSON

 
ABSTRACT 
The tax law treats married and unmarried taxpayers differently in 
several respects. Married persons, for example, can file and pay their 
taxes as a unified taxpayer, with rates that are different than those that 
apply to unmarried taxpayers. This different treatment of married persons 
has elicited criticism over the years. Some of the more salient criticisms 
include that married persons do not necessarily function as an economic 
unit, that joint filing discourages women from working, and that the 
various exclusions from the joint filing regime—including gay couples—is 
unfair. 
This Article looks at joint filing through the lens of polygamy. 
Polygamy stretches joint filing beyond what it can handle: while the 
current tax rates could accommodate same-sex couples without any 
substantive changes, applying the current married-filing-jointly tax 
brackets to polygamous taxpayers would have absurd—and often unjust—
results. Polygamous marriage is not only quantitatively different than 
dyadic marriage—it is qualitatively different. These quantitative and 
qualitative differences render traditional joint filing an untenable fit. 
Ultimately, I conclude that changing from a joint filing system to a 
mandatory individual filing system that recognizes marriage for certain 
purposes would be the fairest and most administrable way to treat 
marriage. Because most commentators think, however, that eliminating 
joint filing will not happen in the foreseeable future, I also provide a 
second-best solution that would fit within the confines of the current joint 
filing regime.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Overwhelmingly, Americans find polygamy distasteful, if not 
immoral.
1
 For some, such distaste seems almost visceral, a reaction to 
what they consider a barbaric and backward practice.
2
 Others point to 
concrete harms polygamy allegedly causes. For example, polygamy‘s 
critics frequently highlight the sexual exploitation of underage girls and 
the general inequality and abuse women face in polygamous communities 
to underscore polygamy‘s immorality.3 But critics do not end their list of 
 
 
 1. A 2008 Gallup poll found that 90 percent of American adults surveyed considered polygamy 
immoral. Arland Thornton, The International Fight Against Barbarism: Historical and Comparative 
Perspectives on Marriage Timing, Consent, and Polygamy, in MODERN POLYGAMY IN THE UNITED 
STATES: HISTORICAL, CULTURAL AND LEGAL ISSUES 259, 283 (Cardell K. Jacobson with Lara Burton 
eds., 2011). 
 2. See, e.g., id. at 274 (―Mormon polygamy was labeled as Asiatic or oriental barbarism and 
was viewed not only as a threat to future advancement but as a force for the destruction of thousands 
of years of European progress.‖). 
 3. See, e.g., Martin Guggenheim, Texas Polygamy and Child Welfare, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 759, 
781 (2009) (―Among the many reasons given to ban polygamy is that such relationships are bad for 
children and that states possess an inherent power to proscribe conduct inimical to the well-being of 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss1/3
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polygamy‘s evils with the abuse of women and girls. As they dig deeper 
into the litany of evils perpetrated by polygamists, critics almost invariably 
mention a problem far less intuitive: tax evasion.
4
  
Still, aside from a glancing mention of tax evasion, no scholarship has 
analyzed the tax environment polygamists face. Instead, nearly all 
academic discussion of polygamy focuses either on whether to 
decriminalize polygamy
5
 or whether polygamists enjoy any level of 
constitutional protection.
6
 Scholars have generally ignored analyzing the 
operation of other generally applicable laws to polygamous families.
7
 
 
 
children.‖); Mark Strasser, Marriage, Free Exercise, and the Constitution, 26 LAW & INEQ. 59, 88 
(2008) (―Courts and commentators have discussed a number of harms associated with the practice of 
polygamy, ranging from the imposition of patriarchy to the abuse and neglect of women and 
children.‖). 
 4. See, e.g., Victims of Polygamy Assistance Act of 2008, S. 3313, 110th Cong. § 2(3) (2008) 
(―The crimes perpetrated by [polygamous] organizations include child abuse, domestic violence, 
welfare fraud, tax evasion, public corruption, witness tampering, and transporting victims across State 
lines.‖); Brandon Griggs, Polygamy Czar Forecasts More Prosecutions Soon; Critics: Not Enough Is 
Being Done, SALT LAKE TRIB., May 12, 2003, at A1 (―Prosecutors also are focusing on tax fraud and 
abuses of the state's welfare system.‖); Richard A. Vazquez, Note, The Practice of Polygamy: 
Legitimate Free Exercise of Religion or Legitimate Public Menace? Revisiting Reynolds in Light of 
Modern Constitutional Jurisprudence, 5 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL‘Y 225, 244 (2001) (―According 
to anti-polygamy activists, welfare and tax fraud are commonplace in Utah‘s polygamous 
communities.‖); Adrienne D. Davis, Regulating Polygamy: Intimacy, Default Rules, and Bargaining 
for Equality, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1975 (2010) (―Polygamy offends a diverse array of interests 
. . . [including] those who argue polygamy provides a cover for a range of fraudulent behavior from 
welfare abuse to tax fraud.‖). 
 5. See, e.g., Shayna M. Sigman, Everything Lawyers Know About Polygamy Is Wrong, 16 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 101 (2006) (arguing that the criminalization of polygamy is based on 
incorrect understanding); Michael Lwin, Big Love: Perry v. Schwarzenegger and Polygamous 
Marriage, 9 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 393 (2011) (comparing movement to decriminalize polygamy 
with movements to decriminalize sodomy and marijuana); Maura Strassberg, The Crime of Polygamy, 
12 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 353 (2003) (arguing that criminalizing polygamy serves the public 
interest).  
 6. See, e.g., Jaime M. Gher, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage—Allies or Adversaries Within 
the Same-Sex Marriage Movement, 14 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 559, 581 (2008) (―The strongest 
arguments in favor of decriminalizing polygamy, however, are constitutional claims for religious 
freedom, Due Process, and Equal Protection.‖); Marci A. Hamilton, The First Amendment’s Challenge 
Function and the Confusion in the Supreme Court’s Contemporary Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 29 
GA. L. REV. 81, 105–10 (1994) (discussing the Supreme Court‘s polygamy jurisprudence); Maura I. 
Strassberg, Distinctions of Form or Substance: Monogamy, Polygamy, and Same-Sex Marriage, 75 
N.C. L. REV. 1501, 1593–94 (1997); Keith E. Sealing, Polygamists Out of the Closet: Statutory and 
State Constitutional Prohibitions Against Polygamy Are Unconstitutional Under the Free Exercise 
Clause, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 691, 757 (2001) (―Very little effort has been put into the analysis of the 
current constitutionality of the nineteenth century polygamy cases in light of current trends in the 
American religious landscape, the modern American family, and First Amendment jurisprudence.‖) 
(footnote omitted); Guggenheim, supra note 3, at 763–64 (arguing that in light of Lawrence, polygamy 
may deserve constitutional protection). 
 7. Though there is no clear explanation for this scholarly oversight, it may, in part, result from 
the general distaste Americans have for polygamy. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
Moreover, because polygamist groups tend to be isolated and reclusive, they can be easy to forget and 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Recently, however, Professor Adrienne Davis introduced a ―different 
approach‖ to polygamy scholarship.8 She proposes moving beyond 
questions of decriminalization and constitutional protections. In doing this, 
she challenges scholars to explore second-generation questions, including 
―whether and how polygamy might be effectively recognized and 
regulated . . . .‖9 Professor Davis goes on to propose that the default rules 
of polygamy could mimic commercial partnership law.
10
  
In the spirit of Professor Davis‘s second-generation polygamy 
paradigm, this Article represents the first attempt to address polygamous 
families and the federal income tax.
11
 Evaluating the appropriate tax 
treatment of polygamous families provides a necessary foundation for all 
scholars of polygamy who are interested in how polygamy in America 
should look. The legalization and regulation of polygamy remain 
relatively impractical unless we know how polygamists will file and pay 
their taxes; polygamists, like most Americans, must earn income. 
Furthermore, like most Americans, they will need to calculate and pay 
taxes on that income. The tax law, however, has no mechanism for dealing 
with polygamous taxpayers. Though changing the focus of the discussion 
from whether polygamy oppresses women to how polygamous families 
can file their taxes seems a descent from the sublime to the banal, paying 
federal income tax represents one of the few experiences common to 
nearly all Americans, irrespective of marital status. The tax system, then, 
represents one legal regime polygamists would need to navigate. 
Much of the scholarship that addresses polygamy also addresses same-
sex marriage.
12
 Both opponents and proponents of polygamy point to 
 
 
to ignore. See Tim B. Heaton & Cardell K. Jacobson, Demographic, Social, and Economic 
Characteristics of a Polygamous Community, in MODERN POLYGAMY IN THE UNITED STATES: 
HISTORICAL, CULTURAL AND LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 1, at 151. 
 8. Davis, supra note 4, at 1958. 
 9. Id.  
 10. Id. at 1959. 
 11. This Article will not address whether, as a normative matter, states should legalize polygamy. 
Rather, it will focus on how to accommodate such a non-traditional family into the joint filing tax 
regime, and on what the struggle to make a polygamous family fit into the regime tells us about the 
viability of joint filing. Nonetheless, several people, in reviewing earlier drafts of this Article, have 
recommended that I lay out my position on the decriminalization and legalization of polygamy. I 
believe, as a normative matter, that polygamy should be decriminalized, though I find myself agnostic 
about its legalization. On a personal level, though, I am a romantic, invested in dyadic marriage. See 
Davis, supra note 4, at 1975 (those offended by polygamy include ―romantics invested in the 
companionate bond that conventional marriage is imagined to engender‖). 
 12. See generally Elizabeth M. Glazer, Sodomy and Polygamy, 111 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 66 
(May 26, 2011), http://www.columbialawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/66_Glazer.pdf; 
Strassberg, supra note 6; Cheshire Calhoun, Who’s Afraid of Polygamous Marriage? Lessons for 
Same-Sex Marriage Advocacy from the History of Polygamy, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1023 (2005); 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss1/3
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growing legal and societal acceptance of homosexuality as paving the way 
toward legalized polygamy.
13
 Same-sex marriage scholarship, moreover, 
has addressed issues of filing and paying taxes.
14
 However, in this area, as 
in others, a polygamous marriage is not merely dyadic marriage plus.
15
 
Although some questions remain about who must file as married
16
 after the 
Supreme Court‘s decision that Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act 
(―DOMA‖) is unconstitutional,17 the tax law will treat opposite-sex and 
recognized same-sex marriages identically. Although scholars have 
debated whether marriage should affect tax filing and tax liability,
18
 once 
there are special rules applicable to married couples, those rules can apply 
in the same manner to all dyadic marriages.  
Polygamous marriage, though, differs from dyadic marriage both 
quantitatively and qualitatively. Taxing a polygamous family under the 
current regime would not provide for horizontal equity between dyadic 
and polygamous households. Instead, the current regime would in fact 
exacerbate marriage penalties and marriage bonuses.
19
 Polygamy 
represents the clichéd square peg to joint filing‘s round hole—to force 
polygamy into the current joint filing regime will necessarily damage 
polygamous families, the joint filing system, or both. Ultimately, this 
Article finds that polygamy constitutes the strongest justification to date 
for switching from joint filing to mandatory individual filing.  
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part II discusses the provenance of 
joint tax filing in the United States, as well as the current criticisms and 
defenses of joint filing. Part III examines tax issues facing nontraditional 
 
 
Samuel C. Rickless, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage: A Response to Calhoun, 42 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 1043 (2005). 
 13. Polygamy advocates in fact point to the Supreme Court‘s decision in Lawrence as paving the 
way toward a right to marry, whether or not it actually does so. See Davis, supra note 4, at 1960 
(―Others call for full recognition and licensure, frequently invoking Lawrence as a strategic step that 
sets the stage for recognition of plural marriage alongside gay marriage.‖). 
 14. See infra Part IV.A. 
 15. Following Professor Davis, this Article will use ―dyadic‖ to describe any marriage between 
just two people, whether the same or opposite genders. See Davis, supra note 4, at 1966 (―Hence, the 
Article uses the term dyadic marriage, or occasionally conventional marriage, to characterize the 
current marital legal regime.‖). 
 16. See Roberton Williams, Same-Sex Couples after DOMA, TAXVOX (Aug. 15, 2013, 3:24 PM), 
http://taxvox.taxpolicycenter.org/2013/08/15/same-sex-couples-after-doma/ (explaining that it is 
unclear whether a same-sex married couple living in a state that does not recognize same-sex 
marriages will file as married or single). 
 17. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695–96 (2013) (holding Section 3 of DOMA 
unconstitutional). 
 18. See infra Part II.B. 
 19. Moreover, the unfairness of the current taxing regime exists even if polygamy remains 
illegal. See infra Part V.A. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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dyadic families, including domestic partnerships, civil unions, same-sex 
marriages, and contrast those with the issues facing polygamous taxpayers. 
Part IV discusses how polygamy implicates the fairness of current tax law. 
Finally, Part V explores a series of approaches that the tax law could 
implement to accommodate polygamous taxpayers. It discusses the pros 
and cons of these several approaches, and gives two proposals that would 
make the tax law‘s treatment of dyadic and polygamous taxpayers more 
equitable.
20
 
II. TAXING MARRIAGE 
Implementing a fair and progressive tax regime is complicated. Trying 
to maintain that fairness and progressivity with respect to married couples 
increases that complexity exponentially.
21
 Once it acknowledges marriage, 
a tax regime must determine whether to treat the married couple as a 
taxpaying unit or whether each individual spouse must pay taxes 
separately. A fair tax system should include marriage neutrality, income 
pooling, and progressive tax rates.
22
 Unfortunately, as Professor Boris 
Bittker famously illustrated, these principles conflict with each other, 
leaving Congress with the weighty task of choosing among these goals in 
designing a marriage tax.
23
  
A. Prelude to the Joint Return 
Although the federal income tax currently treats married couples as an 
appropriate taxpaying unit, the federal income tax has throughout its 
history alternated between treating individuals and married couples as that 
unit.
24
 When Congress originally enacted the federal income tax, it chose 
 
 
 20. In general when talking about polygamy, this Article will assume polygynous (i.e., one man 
with multiple wives) relationships. Although polyandry (one woman with multiple husbands) exists, 
polygyny is the most common form of polygamy. MIRIAM KOKTVEDGAARD ZEITZEN, POLYGAMY: A 
CROSS-CULTURAL ANALYSIS 58 (2008). But the problems and potential solutions discussed in this 
Article should generally apply to any legalized polygamous marriage. 
 21. Samuel D. Brunson, Grown-Up Income Shifting: Yesterday’s Kiddie Tax Is Not Enough, 59 
U. KAN. L. REV. 457, 468 (2011) (―Marriage throws a wrench into the design of a tax system.‖). 
 22. Jane M. Fraser, The Marriage Tax, 32 MGMT. SCI. 831, 831 (1986). Marriage neutrality 
means that a couple‘s tax burden should not change because of marriage or divorce. Income pooling 
means that a married couple‘s tax liability should depend only on their combined income, and not on 
their individual incomes. Progressivity means that higher-income families should pay a higher 
percentage of their incomes in taxes than lower-income families. Id. 
 23. Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389, 1395–96 
(1975). 
 24. Patricia A. Cain, Taxing Families Fairly, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 805, 807–08 (2008). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss1/3
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the individual as the appropriate taxable unit,
25
 imposing tax on the ―net 
income of every individual.‖26 In spite of the plain language of the statute, 
the Bureau of Internal Revenue initially ―took the position that the 1913 
income tax . . . taxed married couples as units.‖27 The next year, though, 
the Treasury Department reversed itself, requiring husbands and wives to 
file separate returns.
28
 A mere four years later, in 1918, the Treasury 
Department changed course again, providing taxpayers an optional joint 
return that allowed married couples to aggregate their incomes if they 
desired.
29
  
In principle, the joint return simplified tax filing for married couples 
―whose combined income was below the amount that would trigger the 
surtax rate.‖30 However, when rates significantly increased with the United 
States‘ entry into World War I,31 filing joint returns became considerably 
less appealing to high-income taxpayers.
32
 The higher rates caused high-
income taxpayers to work harder, when possible, to shift a portion of their 
income to lower-taxed individuals.
33
 For example, a taxpayer in the 35 
percent tax bracket would owe taxes of $700 on an additional $2,000 of 
income, leaving her with $1,300 after taxes. If, however, she could shift 
half of her income to a taxpayer in the 10 percent tax bracket, she would 
pay $350 of taxes on the $1,000 she kept, while the second taxpayer would 
only pay $100 of taxes on his $1,000. Collectively, they would keep 
$1,550, reducing their aggregate tax bill by $250. 
Income-shifting created some risk for the high-income taxpayer, 
though. To the extent he shifted his income to another person, he risked 
losing control of that income and how it would be put to use. In order to 
maintain control over the income and benefit from it, a high-income 
taxpayer would need to shift the income to a person over whom he had 
 
 
 25. Bittker, supra note 23, at 1400. 
 26. Revenue Act of 1913, Section § 2(A)(2), 38 Stat. 114, 166. 
 27. Stephanie Hunter McMahon, To Have and to Hold: What Does Love (of Money) Have To Do 
With Joint Tax Filing?, 11 NEV. L.J. 718, 723 (2011).  
 28. Cain, supra note 24, at 808. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. STEVEN A. BANK ET AL., WAR AND TAXES 64 (2008) (―Designed to raise $850 million from 
income taxes, the [War Revenue Act] dramatically increased individual surtax rates, with the top rate 
rising from 13 to 50 percent.‖). 
 32. Cain, supra note 24, at 809. In 1918, a husband and wife who had $100,000 of taxable 
income paid total taxes of $24,000 if they filed separate returns reflecting $50,000 of income each. If, 
however, they filed jointly, they owed $36,500, $12,500 more than they would have owed filing 
separately. Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Saving Seaborn: Ownership Not Marriage as the Basis of Family 
Taxation, 86 IND. L.J. 1459, 1469–70 (2011). 
 33. Ventry, supra note 32, at 1470. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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some control or whom he justifiably trusted. Often, therefore, he shifted 
his income to his wife or to other family members.
34
 
The courts attempted to hold the line against taxpayers unilaterally 
reducing their tax bills without reducing their income. In general, courts 
held that a taxpayer ―who earns or is otherwise entitled to receive income 
cannot assign it, for tax purposes, to another taxpayer, even if the transfer 
is effective under state law.‖35 Ultimately, though, two Supreme Court 
decisions dealing with intra-spousal income-shifting caused the tax 
treatment of married couples in common law states to differ significantly 
from the tax treatment of married couples in community property states.
36
 
The first of those cases involved an agreement between Mr. and Mrs. 
Earl. In 1901, the couple entered into a contract stipulating that they 
owned all current and future property and income as joint tenants with a 
right of survivorship.
37
 Because his wife had a contractual right to half of 
Mr. Earl‘s income, the Earls argued that he should only report and pay 
taxes on half of his income, while his wife should pay taxes on the other 
half.
38
 The Supreme Court acknowledged both the validity of the contract 
and its effect under California law.
39
 Nonetheless, the Court determined 
that the Revenue Act of 1918 could and did tax salaries ―to those who 
earned them.‖40 Fruit, in the Court‘s analogy, could not be ―attributed to a 
different tree from that on which [it] grew.‖41 Taxpayers could not 
contractually change their tax liability. 
That same year, however, the Supreme Court weakened its fruit-from-
the-tree analogy in a second case involving an attempt to shift income 
from the earner to his spouse. In 1927, H.G. Seaborn and his wife lived in 
 
 
 34. See, e.g., Brunson, supra note 21, at 457–58 (―Congress‘s principal direct assault on income 
shifting sought to prevent wealthy parents from unfairly reducing their tax bills by giving some of their 
dividend-paying stocks and interest-bearing bonds to their children.‖). 
 35. Bittker, supra note 23, at 1400.  
 36. Lily Kahng, One Is the Loneliest Number: The Single Taxpayer in a Joint Return World, 61 
HASTINGS L.J. 651, 653–54 (2010). 
 37. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 113–14 (1930).  
 38. Id. at 113. Although spouses with dissimilar incomes may have tried to evade the higher tax 
rates by contractually dividing their income, see James M. Puckett, Rethinking Tax Priorities: 
Marriage Neutrality, Children, and Contemporary Families, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1409, 1413 (2010), 
the Earls had not entered into this contract to avoid taxes. In 1901, the 16th Amendment and the 
federal income tax were still twelve years away. Rather, their agreement was likely an estate-planning 
device. Patricia A. Cain, The Story of Earl: How Echoes (and Metaphors) from the Past Continue to 
Shape the Assignment of Income Doctrine, in TAX STORIES 305, 314–15 (Paul L. Caron ed., 2d ed. 
2009). 
 39. Earl, 281 U.S. at 114. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 115. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss1/3
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Washington, a community property state.
42
 That year, their income 
included his salary, dividends, interest, and gains on the sale of property, 
including real estate that was held solely in his name.
43
 They filed separate 
returns for their 1927 taxable year, each reporting half of the collective 
income and claiming half of the deductions. While technically the law 
vested Mrs. Seaborn with half of the property, the Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue argued that Mr. Seaborn had so much control over the 
property that, as long as the marriage lasted, all of the income belonged to 
him.
44
 As a result, the Commissioner claimed Mr. Seaborn should have 
declared all of his income on his return.
45
 Rejecting the Commissioner‘s 
contention, the Supreme Court held that because the state law treated the 
Seaborn‘s income as belonging to the couple as a community, the couple 
was correct to file separate returns, each declaring half of their total 
income.
46
 
The Seaborn decision created a rift between states. Married couples in 
community property states could file separate returns, splitting their 
income and potentially paying less in taxes than similarly-situated married 
couples in common law states. Moreover, as a result of the Earl decision, 
couples in common-law states had no way to replicate this intra-spousal 
income-shifting. As a result of this split, a married couple‘s tax bill 
differed depending on the state in which they lived.  
In 1941, after an unsuccessful attempt at preventing income-shifting by 
itself, the Treasury Department convinced the House Ways and Means 
Committee to recommend that Congress enact a mandatory joint return for 
married couples.
47
 As part of the Revenue Act of 1941, a married couple 
would have paid taxes on their consolidated income at the rate of a single 
person with the same amount of income.
48
 The reaction to the mandatory 
joint return threatened to defeat the entire Revenue Act, and President 
Roosevelt withdrew the provision.
49
 Although the Treasury tried again in 
 
 
 42. Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 108 (1930). 
 43. Id. at 108–09. 
 44. Id. at 111. 
 45. Id. at 109. 
 46. Id. at 118. 
 47. Bittker, supra note 23, at 1408. 
 48. Id. at 1409. 
 49. Alice Kessler-Harris, ―A Principle of Law but Not of Justice‖: Men, Women and Income 
Taxes in the United States 1913–1948, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN‘S STUD. 331, 345 (1997). Under 
the Treasury‘s proposal, most married couples in community property states would pay higher taxes, 
as would married couples in common law states if both spouses earned income from services or 
investments. At the same time, two people with separate sources of income would pay more taxes if 
they married than if they remained single. Bittker, supra note 23, at 1409. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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1942—this time with protection for wives‘ wages—the provision met the 
same demise as its predecessor did.
50
 
While the federal government tried unsuccessfully to eliminate the 
disparity between common law and community property states, the states 
themselves worked to exploit the difference for the benefit of their 
residents. Oklahoma and Oregon enacted legislation allowing married 
couples to elect into a newly created community property regime in an 
attempt to give their residents the ability to split their income for federal 
income tax purposes.
51
 However, the Supreme Court refused to allow 
these elective laws to alter the tax treatment of married couples, saying 
that, at best, ―the present policy of Oklahoma is to permit spouses, by 
contract, to alter the status which they would otherwise have under the 
prevailing property system in the State.‖52 The Court held that the 
Oklahoma statute functioned in essentially the same manner as the 
contract in Earl, and that such an elective property regime could not 
prevent the government from taxing the person who earned the income.
53
 
In reaction to the Supreme Court‘s decision, Oklahoma and Oregon 
amended their community property statutes, making them mandatory.
54
 
Hawaii, Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Nebraska soon followed and, by 
1948, New York and Massachusetts were considering community property 
laws.
55
 The states did not necessarily desire to change to community 
property law—a study in New York warned of significant difficulties in 
the transition—but without a federal solution, they saw this self-help as 
necessary.
56
 Still, in spite of their importance to married taxpayers, these 
moves from common law to community property caused ―upheaval and 
uncertainty.‖57 Skeptics argued that the laws had been passed too quickly 
and that they would upset individuals‘ earlier plans.58 Moreover, it was not 
always clear how the community property laws could be grafted onto a 
state‘s existing common law foundation.59 
 
 
 50. Kessler-Harris, supra note 49, at 345. 
 51. Bittker, supra note 23, at 1411. 
 52. Comm‘r v. Harmon, 323 U.S. 44, 47 (1944). 
 53. Id.  
 54. Bittker, supra note 23, at 1411–12. 
 55. Id. at 1412. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Kahng, supra note 36, at 654. 
 58. Carolyn C. Jones, Split Income and Separate Spheres: Tax Law and Gender Roles in the 
1940s, 6 LAW & HIST. REV. 259, 272 (1988). 
 59. Id. (―For example, in Oregon, questions arose as to whether historical Spanish law would be 
authoritative in construing Oregon‘s 1945 community-property statute.‖). 
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As common law states turned to self-help to achieve tax benefits for 
their residents, some demanded that the federal law change. In reaction to 
this lobbying—and buoyed by significant surpluses—Congress enacted 
the Revenue Act of 1948.
60
 The Revenue Act of 1948 permitted married 
couples to file jointly and to enjoy a marginal tax bracket twice as large as 
the bracket applicable to an unmarried taxpayer.
61
 Congress intended for 
this new joint filing option to equalize the taxation of married couples 
between common law and community property states and, as a result, 
eliminate the incentive for common law states to enact community 
property statutes.
62
 
As long as the tax brackets for married couples filing jointly were twice 
the size of the brackets that applied to individuals, a married couple never 
paid more in taxes than two unmarried taxpayers with the same income.
63
 
More than two decades later, finally recognizing the unfairness toward 
unmarried taxpayers, Congress enacted a new rate schedule for married 
couples in 1969; a married couple‘s marginal brackets under the new 
schedule remained wider than, but not twice as wide as, the brackets of 
single taxpayers.
64
  
B. Problems With Joint Filing 
Though Congress introduced joint filing to solve the problem of taxing 
couples differently based on their state of residence, joint filing threw a 
wrench into the design of the tax system. A tax system that includes joint 
filing cannot have progressive tax rates and achieve both marriage and 
couples neutrality—all reasonable goals of a just tax system.65 As long as 
married couples can file joint returns, then, lawmakers must choose 
whether to discard progressivity, marriage neutrality, or couples neutrality. 
The tax system will not sacrifice progressivity. Even advocates of a flat 
tax recognize the need for some degree of progressive rates to protect the 
poorest taxpayers.
66
 A progressive income tax applies increasingly higher 
 
 
 60. Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-471, § 103, 62 Stat. 110 (1948); see McMahon, supra 
note 27, at 736. 
 61. Puckett, supra note 38, at 1414. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Kahng, supra note 36, at 655. 
 64. Bittker, supra note 23, at 1428. 
 65. Brunson, supra note 21, at 469. 
 66. See, e.g., Robert E. Hall & Alvin Rabushka, The Route to a Progressive Flat Tax, 5 CATO J. 
465, 466 (1985) (―[O]ur flat tax proposal puts a tax of 19 percent on all consumption above a generous 
exemption ($12,600 for a family of four). It is progressive where it counts most, for the poor and near-
poor.‖). 
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rates of tax as a taxpayer‘s income increases.67 And to the extent that 
marriage changes the taxpaying unit, a progressive tax cannot escape 
treating taxpayers differently depending on their marital status.
68
  
Moreover, joint filing causes three significant departures from marriage 
and couples neutrality: the singles penalty, the marriage penalty, and the 
marriage bonus. Each of these departures violates the tax norm of 
horizontal equity, which holds that taxpayers with similar income should 
pay a similar amount of taxes.
69
 To better understand the degree to which 
each of these departs from the principle of horizontal equity, it is useful to 
see how each operates in real terms. 
The singles penalty applies when an unmarried individual has the same 
income as a married couple.
70
 For example, compare Susan, an unmarried 
individual who has taxable income of $100,000, with Scott and Stacy, a 
married couple who each earn $50,000. In 2013, Susan would owe 
$21,293 in federal income taxes.
71
 Scott and Stacy, on the other hand, 
would owe just $16,858 in taxes, significantly less than Susan.
72
 
A married couple faces the marriage penalty when the couple pays 
more taxes than two unmarried individuals with the same taxable 
income.
73
 The marriage penalty generally comes into play when both 
spouses earn approximately the same income.
74
 John and Jane, for 
example, each has $85,000 in taxable income. In 2013, if John and Jane 
are married and file a joint return, their combined income puts them in the 
28-percent tax bracket, and they owe $35,066.
75
 If, however, John and 
Jane had chosen not to marry, each would be in the 25-percent tax 
 
 
 67. Lawrence Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 339, 339 (1994). 
Although periodically somebody argues for a flat (that is, non-progressive) income tax, even the most 
committed supporters of a flat tax do not advocate a ―true flat-rate tax [that] would tax all 
income . . .[,] starting with the first dollar, at the same rate.‖ Barbara H. Fried, The Puzzling Case for 
Proportionate Taxation, 2 CHAP. L. REV. 157, 160–61 (1999). Americans generally recognize the need 
for some degree of progressivity in the tax system. 
 68. Zelenak, supra note 67, at 339–40. 
 69. See, e.g., Richard A. Musgrave, Horizontal Equity, Once More, 43 NAT‘L TAX. J. 113, 113 
(1990) (―The call for equity in taxation is generally taken to include a rule of horizontal equity . . ., 
requiring equal treatment of equals, and one of vertical equity . . ., calling for an appropriate 
differentiation among unequals.‖). 
 70. Kahng, supra note 36, at 656.  
 71. Rev. Proc. 2013-15 § 2.01, 2013-5 I.R.B. 444 (2013).  
 72. Id. Moreover, because the married couple can take a deduction for two personal exemptions, 
as opposed to the single personal exemption available to an unmarried taxpayer, a married couple pays 
less in taxes while having a higher gross income than an unmarried individual. I.R.C. § 151 (West 
2013). 
 73. Kahng, supra note 36, at 656. 
 74. Bittker, supra note 23, at 1429–30.  
 75. Rev. Proc. 2013-15 § 2.01, 2013-5 I.R.B. 444 (2013). 
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bracket.
76
 Both John and Jane would owe $17,179 in taxes, for a combined 
tax liability of $34,358. Marriage costs John and Jane an additional $708 
in taxes.  
Where spouses‘ income differs significantly, on the other hand, a 
married couple may benefit from the marriage bonus.
77
 Imagine Mary, 
who has taxable income of $170,000, and Mark, with no income. In 2013, 
if Mary and Mark are married, they would be in the 28-percent tax 
bracket, and would face a tax liability of $35,066, the same amount as the 
married John and Jane. If, however, Mary and Mark were not married, 
Mark, with no income, would owe no taxes. Mary would still be in the 28-
percent tax bracket. But, because the tax brackets for unmarried 
individuals differ from those that apply to married couples, she would owe 
$40,893 in taxes.
78
 In this case, marriage reduces Mary and Mark‘s 
collective tax bill by $5,827. 
In addition to the inequities imposed by the joint filing regime, the 
different rules applicable to married persons filing jointly increase the 
complexity of the tax law. The tax law necessarily includes a ―multiplicity 
of rules regarding who is (or is not) married for tax purposes.‖79 And once 
a couple has passed this threshold, they ―use different tax tables, have a 
different standard deduction, and are entitled to double the maximum 
exclusion from gain on the sale of a principal residence.‖80  
As a result of the inequities and complexity that follow joint filing, a 
number of commentators argue for a return to the individual as the 
appropriate taxpaying unit. Few developed countries other than the United 
States still permit married couples to file joint tax returns.
81
 Moreover, 
―the joint return was enacted not as a result of reasoned tax policy 
analysis, but rather out of political expediency.‖82 As a result of the lack of 
policy undergirding the joint return, combined with the trends in the rest of 
 
 
 76. Id.  
 77. Dorothy A. Brown, Racial Equality in the Twenty-First Century: What’s Tax Policy Got to 
Do With It?, 21 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 759, 760 (1999) (―The marriage bonus is the greatest 
when only one spouse is contributing to total household income by working in the paid labor 
market.‖); see also Kahng, supra note 36, at 655.  
 78. Rev. Proc. 2013-15 § 2.01, 2013-5 I.R.B. 444 (2013). 
 79. Anthony C. Infanti, Decentralizing Family: An Inclusive Proposal for Individual Tax Filing 
in the United States, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 605, 617. 
 80. Samuel A. Donaldson, The Easy Case Against Tax Simplification, 22 VA. TAX REV. 645, 
682–83 (2003). 
 81. See, e.g., Kahng, supra note 36, at 652. 
 82. Id. 
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the world, commentators conclude that the United States should replace its 
joint filing with individual filing for all taxpayers.
83
 
Proponents of an individual filing system also argue that marriage does 
not inherently equate to income-pooling. Although a married couple can 
act as an economic unit, most states do not require it to do so.
84
 And some 
scholars argue that a significant percentage of married couples do not pool 
their incomes.
85
 To the extent that the tax law permits joint filing to 
accurately reflect the income of married couples who share their incomes, 
evidence that married couples do not share their income argues against the 
necessity and sensibility of a joint return. The fact that the joint return 
increases the tax law‘s complexity and inequity strengthens this argument 
even more. 
In addition, these commentators argue that joint filing hurts women. 
Under the U.S. federal income tax, a taxpayer pays a progressively higher 
rate of tax on income as her income increases. In 2013, an unmarried 
taxpayer pays ten percent of her first $8,925 of taxable income, then 
fifteen percent of her next $26,000; ultimately, she pays 39.6 percent of 
her income in excess of $400,000.
86
 Two individual taxpayers each pay 
taxes on a portion of their income at the lower tax rates. A married couple, 
however, can take advantage of the lower rates only once. As a result, the 
secondary earner (traditionally the wife) feels like she pays the same 
percentage of taxes on her first dollar of income as her husband did on his 
last dollar of income.
87
 She may decide, in light of her lower after-tax 
income, that such income is not worth the effort and expense of working 
and, therefore, stay out of the paid workforce.
88
 
Proponents of individual filing also argue that joint filing creates 
significant inequities between taxpayers. For example, while a married 
couple may pay higher or lower taxes than an unmarried couple with the 
 
 
 83. See Stephanie Hunter McMahon, London Calling: Does the U.K.’s Experience with 
Individual Taxation Clash with the U.S.’s Expectations?, 55 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 159, 161 n.2 (2010) 
(listing commentators in favor of eliminating joint returns). 
 84. See, e.g., Shari Motro, A New ―I Do‖: Towards a Marriage-Neutral Income Tax, 91 IOWA L. 
REV. 1509, 1519 (2006) (―In the forty-one states that apply common-law principles to marital-property 
matters, the wage earner is the wage owner during marriage.‖). 
 85. Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Love, Money, and the IRS: Family, Income-Sharing, and the Joint 
Income Tax Return, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 63, 108 (1993).  
 86. Rev. Proc. 2013-15 § 2.01, 2013-5 I.R.B. 444 (2013). 
 87. Anne L. Alstott, Tax Policy and Feminism: Competing Goals and Institutional Choices, 96 
COLUM. L. REV. 2001, 2009 (1996). 
 88. Amy C. Christian, Joint and Several Liability and the Joint Return: Its Implications for 
Women, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 535, 601 (1998) (―Joint return rates, which incorporate both income 
splitting and aggregation, most likely discourage many married women from entering the work force 
or from remaining in it when they marry.‖). 
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same aggregate taxable income, the married couple will always pay less 
than a single person with the same amount of taxable income.
89
 Moreover, 
the tax law treats a heterosexual married couple differently than an 
unmarried couple, even if that unmarried couple pools all of its income 
and expenses. And this different treatment cannot be justified purely on 
administrability grounds: couples in state-sanctioned civil unions or 
domestic partnership with the same rights and responsibilities as married 
couples cannot file a joint return.
90
 Besides the unfairness of treating 
similarly situated taxpayers differently, this different treatment imposes 
real costs on taxpayers.
91
 
Given the controversy and complexity of the joint return, it is worth 
inquiring whether there is any reason the tax law should take account of 
marital—or other familial—relationships. Notwithstanding the arguments 
against the joint return, some scholars argue that the tax law should 
continue to permit married couples to file joint returns. For example, 
although not all married couples pool all of their income, the extant studies 
demonstrate high levels of income pooling by married couples.
92
 
Moreover, some argue, even if joint returns cause some inequities, shifting 
 
 
 89. Kahng, supra note 36, at 660. 
 90. Cain, supra note 24, at 805. Recently, however, the I.R.S. Office of Associate Chief Counsel 
(Procedure and Administration) asserted that unmarried couples in a state-recognized civil union or 
domestic partnership could, under certain circumstances, file a joint return. Amy S. Elliott, IRS Memo 
Indicates Civil Unions Are Marriages for Tax Purposes, 133 TAX NOTES 794, 794 (2011). In its letter, 
the I.R.S. says that, for federal income tax purposes, opposite-sex couples ―living in a relationship that 
the state would treat as husband and wife‖ can file joint tax returns. Letter from Pamela Wilson Fuller, 
Senior Technician Reviewer, I.R.S. Office of Associate Chief Counsel (Procedure and 
Administration), to Robert Shair, Senior Tax Advisor, H&R Block (Aug. 30, 2011), available at 
http://law.scu.edu/blog/samesextax/file/IRS%20Civil%20Union%20letter.pdf. Still, although it reflects 
current I.R.S. policy, the letter does not actually provide legal authority for taxpayers in civil unions or 
domestic partnerships to file joint returns. See Elliott, supra, at 794 (―David Lee Rice . . . cautioned 
that the letter holds no weight of authority.‖). Nonetheless, the letter demonstrates a recognition that 
joint filing can follow economic unity reflected by institutions other than just traditional marriage. 
 91. Cain, supra note 24, at 806. For example, if an employer provides health insurance to a 
same-sex spouse, the value of that insurance is treated as income. Moreover, same-sex spouses cannot 
take advantage of the estate tax‘s marital deduction. Peter Applebome, A Doubly Trying Season for 
Same-Sex Couples, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2013, at BU8. Even the cost of tax return preparation is 
higher for same-sex spouses. Tara Siegel Bernard, Gay Couples: Tax Challenge, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 
2012, at B4. 
 92. See, e.g., Stephanie Hoffer, Adopting the Family Taxable Unit, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 55, 78 
n.148 (2007) (―As a result, the argument that family pooling is not supported by empirical data is not 
well founded, at least as regards basic expenses.‖); Zelenak, supra note 67, at 351 (―Far from 
indicating the weakness of the pooling assumption, Kornhauser‘s data . . . indicates that only 9% of 
couples deposit none of their earnings in joint accounts—and even among that 9%, the use of separate 
accounts does not necessarily negate pooling.‖). 
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to individual returns would create administrative and other difficulties that 
would ultimately result in deadweight loss.
93
 
Moreover, as Professor Stephanie Hunter McMahon points out, the fact 
that other countries have switched from joint filing to individual filing 
provides an example of the costs and benefits of the switch.
94
 She 
concludes that the change provided both benefits and detriments to women 
in the United Kingdom. Married women appear to own more investment 
property than they did before the change.
95
 But there is no clear evidence 
that the change increased the number of British women who entered the 
workforce.
96
 Professor McMahon concludes that eliminating the joint 
return will benefit some taxpayers while harming others. Ultimately, 
though, any tax system will create distortions, and these distortions need to 
be weighed as part of the debate over the future of joint filing.
 97
 
Another argument in continuing to recognize marriage for tax purposes 
is that marriage plays an important role in American life. It ―has enormous 
value to Americans as an institution that makes social unity possible, even 
in a world in which individuality has been fully cultivated.‖98 Even 
commentators who do not particularly like the institution of marriage 
recognize that it is ―a dominant and normative institution, with life-
altering formal and informal benefits.‖99 The Internal Revenue Code 
reflects this primacy of marriage in the United States, with many special 
rules aimed at marital or other familial relationships.
100
 Among other 
things, these special rules may take into account the fact that people act 
 
 
 93. McMahon, supra note 27, at 755. 
 94. McMahon, supra note 83, at 161–62 (―Most of the American scholars who agree with this 
conclusion do so without examining the many real world examples of [moving to individual filing] 
that can be found outside America's borders.‖). 
 95. Id. at 202–03 (―But while the study found that couples would not shift income to the 
maximum extent possible to secure a tax reduction, it did find an increase in three outcomes: the 
proportion of wives having any investment income; the fraction of household investment income 
owned by wives; and the fraction of households in which the wife held all of the investment income.‖). 
 96. Id. at 197–98. 
 97. Id. at 218 (―Instead, it requires deciding how to allocate a tax reduction among various family 
types. Unfortunately, when deciding the best tax unit, there is no choice that simply removes 
distortions in behavior. Each choice always benefits some family arrangement.‖). 
 98. Strassberg, supra note 6, at 1623–24. In her article, Professor Strassberg argues in favor of 
recognizing same-sex marriage while, at the same time, argues against decriminalizing, much less 
legalizing, polygamy. Id. at 1623. 
 99. Davis, supra note 4, at 1963. 
 100. Theodore P. Seto, The Unintended Tax Advantages of Gay Marriage, 65 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1529, 1531 (2008).  
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altruistically in certain circumstances,
101
 or they may provide married 
couples with a ―zone of privacy‖ protected from I.R.S. inquiry.102 
III. NON-TRADITIONAL FAMILIES AND THE FUTURE OF THE JOINT RETURN 
A. Non-Traditional Dyadic Taxpayers 
Notwithstanding the controversy surrounding joint filing, few—even 
those who prefer individual filing—believe that the United States will 
switch to a mandatory individual filing system, at least in the near 
future.
103
 As a result of the joint return‘s apparent future, these 
commentators have focused on making joint filing fairer and more broadly 
available.
104
 They provide a number of suggestions for how to accomplish 
these goals. They argued, prior to Windsor, that same-sex married couples 
should be permitted to file joint returns.
105
 In addition to same-sex married 
couples, some argue that the tax law could permit anybody in a legally-
recognized relationship (e.g., marriage, civil union, domestic partnership) 
to file a joint return.
106
 Congress could expand the availability of joint 
filing to virtually any couple that demonstrates that they pool their 
incomes (while possibly excluding married couples who do not pool their 
incomes).
107
 The ability to file joint returns could even be based on 
ownership of income and assets.
108
 
 
 
 101. Seto, supra note 100, at 1538. 
 102. Infanti, supra note 79, at 643. 
 103. See, e.g., Motro, supra note 84, at 1513 (―However, though mandatory separate filing has 
many appeals, it is now widely regarded as politically unrealistic.‖); Lawrence Zelenak, Doing 
Something About Marriage Penalties: A Guide for the Perplexed, 54 TAX L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2000) 
(―Although mandatory separate returns for all taxpayers would eliminate all marriage penalties (and all 
marriage bonuses), that does not seem to be a politically possibility in the near future.‖). Professor 
Anthony C. Infanti believes that the U.S. shifting to individual filing is ―not as politically unrealistic as 
other commentators believe.‖ Infanti, supra note 79, at 621. Even he, however, sees the change 
becoming more likely ―as time passes,‖ rather than immediately. Id. 
 104. See, e.g., McMahon, supra note 27, at 756 (―That conclusion does not mean that the system 
should not recognize new forms of American families.‖). 
 105. See, e.g., McMahon, supra note 27, at 756 (―So, too, should same-sex couples . . . .‖). 
 106. See, e.g., Cain, supra note 24, at 851 (―Another possible solution for same-sex couples would 
be to extend spousal treatment to those couples whose relationships are recognized under state law.‖). 
 107. Motro, supra note 84, at 1545. Although this would be the most precise way to determine if a 
couple should be permitted to file a joint return, it would be administratively unfeasible. Id. Still, the 
fact that the tax law cannot implement a perfect joint filing regime does not argue against a next-best 
solution. ―Every tax system, of course, trades off accuracy for simplicity to some degree.‖ Kyle D. 
Logue & Gustavo G. Vettori, Narrowing the Tax Gap Through Presumptive Taxation, 2 COLUM. J. 
TAX L. 100, 104 (2011). 
 108. Ventry, supra note 32, at 1465 (―Eighty years after Seaborn and sixty years after passage of 
the income-splitting provision, ownership of income and property remains the guidepost of family 
taxation.‖). 
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None of these proposed expansions, however, requires any 
fundamental restructuring of the tax system. We know exactly how the 
current tax regime will treat married gay couples who can file jointly; 
moreover, we know how it would treat domestic partners and couples in a 
civil union if the tax law recognized their relationship. The current 
marginal rates applicable to a married couple filing jointly would work 
equally well for any of these couples. For that matter, ignoring problems 
surrounding the issue of which dyadic couples should be allowed to file 
joint returns, the current marginal rate structure could apply to any two-
person taxpaying unit.
109
 Actually implementing the change may require a 
minor legislative or administrative action; references to ―husband and 
wife‖110 would need to become gender-neutral, for example. But such a 
change need not be burdensome or complicated: already under the Code, 
―words importing the masculine gender include the feminine as well.‖111 A 
similar definitional provision could provide that ―husband and wife‖ 
referred to any person in a specified relationship. 
A tax regime that required individual filing would clearly reduce the 
inequities between heterosexual married taxpayers and other taxpayers in 
dyadic relationships, whether or not they pool their incomes. But the fact 
that the structure of the current tax system could permit other taxpayers in 
dyadic relationships to file jointly without adding complexity to the tax 
law suggests that perhaps expanding joint filing can similarly solve the 
fairness question. And if we assume that mandatory individual filing is 
currently a political nonstarter, it is worth noting that same-sex marriage 
does not challenge the structure or administration of the tax system as 
currently constituted. 
 
 
 109. There may be enforcement and privacy reasons not to extend joint filing to any two people, 
or even to any two people who claim to be in a relationship in which they pool their income. 
Confirming that each couple that claimed economic unity acted as an economic unit would create a 
nearly insurmountable administrative burden for the I.R.S. Moreover, even if the I.R.S. has the 
resources to confirm that a couple was, in fact, an economic unit, the inquiry would likely prove 
overly-intrusive. As such, it makes sense that the tax system would use a proxy, such as state 
recognition. But if the tax law chooses a state-recognized relationship (in this case, opposite-sex 
marriage) as the proxy for economic unity, there is no reason not to also include other state-recognized 
relationships with similar legal rights and obligations, including same-sex marriage, domestic 
partnerships, and civil unions. Any administrative burden the I.R.S. would face in determining 
whether, in fact, a couple filing jointly had entered into a valid same-sex marriage, civil union, or 
domestic partnership would be qualitatively the same as the burden in currently faces in determining 
whether a couple filing jointly is legally married. 
 110. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6013(a) (2006) (―A husband and wife may make a single return jointly of 
income taxes.‖). Moreover, the Code defines ―joint return‖ as ―a single return made jointly under 
section 6013 by a husband and wife.‖ I.R.C. § 7701(a)(38) (2006). 
 111. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). The Code explicitly incorporates this definitional provision. I.R.C. 
§ 7701(p)(1)(3) (2006 & Supp. V 2012).  
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B. Polygamous Taxpayers 
Tens of thousands of polygamists live in the United States. Experts 
estimate that between 20,000 and 100,000 fundamentalist Mormons
112
 
living in the Western United States belong to polygamous households.
113
 
In addition to Mormon polygamists, an estimated 50,000 polygamist 
Muslims live in the United States.
114
 Moreover, several thousand 
polygamous Hmong live in the United States.
115
 
Though their experiences with polygamy undoubtedly differ in many 
ways, all polygamists share one common experience: by virtue of their 
polygamy, they violate the law. In 1862, Congress criminalized polygamy 
in U.S territories.
116
 In response to a constitutional challenge to the law, 
the Supreme Court asserted that ―civilized nations‖ had always considered 
polygamy ―odious.‖117 An ―offence [sic] against society,‖ polygamy was 
compatible only with despotic, rather than republican, government.
118
 As a 
result, the Supreme Court determined that anti-polygamy laws did not 
violate the constitutional right to free exercise of religion.
119
 Today, every 
state has laws prohibiting polygamy.
120
  
 
 
 112. Although the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (i.e., the Mormon church) formally 
discontinued polygamy in 1890, certain leaders and members believed that polygamy should continue, 
and formed their own schismatic sects. Janet Bennion, History, Culture, and Variability of Mormon 
Schismatic Groups, in MODERN POLYGAMY IN THE UNITED STATES: HISTORICAL, CULTURAL AND 
LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 1, at 101, 102. This Article uses the term ―fundamentalist Mormon‖ to refer 
to these polygamous groups that trace back to, but broke from, the mainstream Mormon church. 
 113. See, e.g., UTAH ATT‘Y GEN.‘S OFFICE & ARIZONA ATT‘Y GEN.‘S OFFICE, THE PRIMER: 
HELPING VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND CHILD ABUSE IN POLYGAMOUS COMMUNITIES 12–24 
(2006) (estimating more than 27,000 members of various polygamous Mormon groups); John Gibeaut, 
Violation or Salvation?, 93 A.B.A. J., Feb. 2007, at 26, 28 (estimating 30,000 polygamists in Western 
United States and Canada); JON KRAKAUER, UNDER THE BANNER OF HEAVEN: A STORY OF VIOLENT 
FAITH 5 (2003) (estimating 30,000 to 100,000 fundamentalist Mormons currently practicing 
polygamy). 
 114. Some Muslims in U.S. Quietly Engage in Polygamy, NPR (May 27, 2008, 12:49 AM), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=90857818. In fact, ―Philadelphia has the highest 
density of polygamy, due to a combination of conversions to Islam, currents of racial nationalism, and 
the demographic effects of male incarceration and underemployment.‖ Davis, supra note 4, at 1974. 
 115. ZEITZEN, supra note 20, at 166.  
 116. Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act, 12 Stat. 501 (1862).  
 117. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164–65 (1878). 
 118. Id. at 165. 
 119. Id. at 166. 
 120. Teri Dobbins Baxter, Private Oppression: How Laws That Protect Privacy Can Lead to 
Oppression, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 415, 436 (2010) (―Polygamy is illegal in Texas and every other 
state.‖) (footnote omitted). In spite of polygamy‘s illegality, for political and practical reasons, states 
often hesitate to enforce their polygamy laws. See Shayna M. Sigman, Everthing Lawyers Know About 
Polygamy is Wrong, 16 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 101, 142 (2006) (―The era of under-enforcement 
began after Short Creek and persists now, over fifty years later.‖). 
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Although historically Americans have recoiled from polygamy, treating 
it as a primitive, inferior custom,
121
 polygamy has recently started to 
emerge as less alien and more sympathetic. In no small part, HBO‘s Big 
Love, a television series chronicling a polygamous family in Utah, and 
TLC‘s Sister Wives, a reality television show following a polygamous 
family in Utah, may lie behind this change in attitude.
122
 By exposing 
Americans to polygamous families, real or fictional, polygamy arguably 
loses some of its otherness and danger.
123
 Moreover, in the wake of 
Texas‘s mishandled raid of the polygamous Yearning for Zion Ranch, 
polygamists began to look less like scary, despotic usurpers
124
 and more 
like scared victims of democratically elected governments.
125
 In addition, 
changes in the law may also make polygamy more visible in the future. As 
recently as 2011, polygamists cited the Supreme Court‘s decision in 
Lawrence v. Texas,
126
 which held unconstitutional a Texas anti-sodomy 
law,
127
 to argue that criminalizing polygamy also violates the 
Constitution.
128
 
Even as polygamy transitions in the public mind from an odious and 
uncivilized practice to an acceptable, if unusual, practice by a minority 
 
 
 121. See Martha M. Ertman, Race Treason: The Untold Story of America’s Ban on Polygamy, 19 
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 287, 289 (2010) (―According to this view, polygamy was natural for people 
of color, but unnatural for White Americans of Northern European descent. When Whites engaged in 
this unnatural practice, antipolygamists contended, they produced a ‗peculiar race.‘‖) (footnote 
omitted).  
 122. Davis, supra note 4, at 1956–57 (―Some have even predicted Big Love might do for 
polygamists what Will & Grace and Queer Eye for the Straight Guy did for gays: familiarizing the 
foreign and smoothing the way for recognition and real rights.‖); John Schwartz, Polygamist, Under 
Scrutiny in Utah, Plans Suit to Challenge Law, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2011, at A10 (―The [polygamous 
Brown] family is the focus of a reality TV show, ‗Sister Wives,‘ that first appeared in 2010.‖). 
 123. See, e.g., John Tierney, Who’s Afraid of Polygamy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2006, at A15 
(―This story of a husband with three wives in Utah will not terrify Americans. Polygamy doesn't come 
off as a barbaric threat to the country's moral fabric. It looks more like what it really is: an arrangement 
that can make sense for some people in some circumstances, but not one that could ever be a 
dangerous trend in America.‖). 
 124. See, e.g., Strassberg, supra note 5, at 356 (―In particular, I argued that polygyny not only fails 
to produce critical building blocks of liberal democracy, . . . but promotes a despotic state populated by 
subjects rather than citizens.‖) (footnote omitted).  
 125. On April 3, 2008, Texas law enforcement raided the Yearning for Zion Ranch, a polygamous 
community, and removed more than 400 children from their families. Tamara N. Lewis Arredondo, 
Toward a Viable Policing Model for Closed Religious Communities, 35 AM. J. CRIM. L. 107, 110–11 
(2008). A year later, with no evidence of danger to the children, all except for one had been returned to 
their families. Linda F. Smith, Child Protection Law and the FLDS Raid in Texas, in MODERN 
POLYGAMY IN THE UNITED STATES: HISTORICAL, CULTURAL AND LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 1, at 301, 
317. 
 126. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 127. Id. at 579. 
 128. See Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive, and Other Relief at 7–8, Brown v. Herbert, No. 
2:11-CV-00652 (D. Utah July 13, 2011). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss1/3
  
 
 
 
 
2013] TAXING POLYGAMY 133 
 
 
 
 
group, polygamists will necessarily interact with legal regimes differently 
than do dyadic couples. Although polygamy, like same-sex marriage, 
domestic partnerships, and civil unions, represents an alternative to the 
traditional American family, it presents unique challenges in designing a 
tax regime.
129
 Unlike dyadic same-sex marriage, polygamy presents a 
significant challenge to a tax filing system designed to treat married 
persons as an economic unit, where it assumes that an economic unit 
consists of two people. Specifically, legalized polygamy would challenge 
the design of the marginal tax brackets. The tax law includes four sets of 
marginal tax brackets, applying respectively to married persons filing 
jointly and surviving spouses, heads of household, unmarried individuals, 
and married persons filing separately.
130
 Treasury adjusts the size of the 
brackets annually for inflation.
131
 Currently, the tax brackets for married 
persons filing jointly range from twice the size of the brackets for 
unmarried individuals at the lower income levels to identical at the highest 
income levels.
132
  
The current marginal tax brackets do not provide any assistance in 
determining the appropriate marginal tax brackets that would apply to 
polygamous families. In a world of legalized polygamy that treated 
spouses as an appropriate taxable unit, polygamous taxpayers would still 
encounter potentially significant marriage penalties in comparison to both 
four unmarried taxpayers and two dyadic couples.
133
 
Take, for example, the polygynous Henrickson family portrayed in 
HBO‘s Big Love that consists of Bill and his three wives, Barbara, Nicki, 
and Margene.
134
 In 2013, each earns $25,000. If the tax law permitted 
polygamous spouses to file jointly, but required them to use the current 
marginal tax brackets, the Henricksons would face a significant marriage 
penalty. Their collective income would put them in the 25-percent tax 
 
 
 129. Cf. Glazer, supra note 12, at 78 (―Polygamy is different from dyadic marriage, and it is 
different from homosexuality.‖). 
 130. I.R.C. § 1(a)–(d) (West 2013). 
 131. Id. § 1(f). 
 132. In 2013, the 10 percent and 15 percent tax brackets were twice as large as that for unmarried 
individuals in the same respective tax brackets. The ceiling for the 25 percent tax bracket for married 
individuals filing jointly terminated at about 166 percent of income level for married individuals, while 
the 28 percent bracket for married couples filing jointly ended at about 122 percent of the level for 
single individuals. The 33 percent bracket, on the other hand, ended at the same income level for 
married persons filing jointly and for single individuals, the 35 percent bracket for married couples 
filing jointly ended at about 113 percent of the bracket for single taxpayers, and the 39.6 percent 
bracket had no upper limit. Rev. Proc. 2013-15 § 2.01, 2013-5 I.R.B. 444 (2013). 
 133. See infra Part V.B.  
 134. The Henricksons were the main characters of HBO‘s Big Love. See Alessandra Stanley, One 
Man, Three Wives and Many Troubles, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2006, at E21. 
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bracket, and they would owe taxes of $16,858.
135
 By contrast, four 
unmarried individuals with $25,000 of taxable income would each be in 
the 15-percent tax bracket and would each pay taxes of $3,304. 
Collectively, the four would pay a total of $13,216.
136
 As a result of being 
in a higher bracket, the Hendricksons would pay over $3,500 more than 
the four unmarried counterparts in this scenario, despite the fact that the 
two groups‘ collective income is exactly the same. 
In addition to the marriage penalty applicable to polygamous taxpayers, 
applying the current brackets would accentuate the disincentive for the 
secondary (and, in the case of polygamous families, tertiary, etc.) earner to 
work. For a dyadic married couple, the secondary earner‘s income is 
stacked on top of the primary earner‘s income.137 In a polygamous 
marriage, using current marginal tax brackets, the secondary earner‘s 
income would be stacked on top of the primary earner‘s, and then the 
tertiary earner‘s income would be stacked on top of both the primary and 
the secondary earner‘s. Each subsequent earner would potentially pay 
taxes on her first dollar of income at the highest marginal rate of the prior 
earner. Because each subsequent worker would enjoy progressively less 
after-tax income, work would become even less appealing for each 
additional plural spouse. Although increasing a family‘s size may increase 
the need for additional spouses to work,
138
 the joint filing system 
discourages those additional individuals from working.  
To ameliorate these heightened marriage penalty and secondary earner 
problems, Congress could create alternative brackets applicable to 
polygamous taxpayers. But creating such individualized tax brackets 
would create administrative burdens as Congress and the Treasury 
Department tried to determine how to design those brackets.
139
 
In many cases, polygamous families‘ income lags behind that of the 
surrounding communities.
140
 And yet, if the tax law continues to refuse to 
recognize polygamous marriage, polygamous families will pay higher 
 
 
 135. Rev. Proc. 2013-15 § 2.01, 2013-5 I.R.B. 444 (2013). 
 136. Id. Note that two dyadic couples, each with $50,000 in taxable income would also be in the 
15-percent tax bracket, and would also collectively pay $13,216. Id. 
 137. See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text.  
 138. See IRWIN ALTMAN & JOSEPH GINAT, POLYGAMOUS FAMILIES IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 
84 (1996) (―Most contemporary plural families struggle financially and are hard put to make ends 
meet. . . . In most cases some wives—often many wives—and all husbands worked to earn money.‖). 
 139. See infra Part V.E. 
 140. See, e.g., Heaton & Jacobson, supra note 7, at 158 (―[O]verall income is comparatively low 
in the [Hildale-Colorado City] polygamous community. The median family income is 37 percent lower 
than in Utah.‖). 
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taxes than dyadic married couples.
141
 In spite of polygamous spouses‘ 
potentially pooling their assets—either informally or as a result of 
community property laws—the tax law would treat such polygamous 
taxpayers as economically independent. In cases where only one spouse 
worked, polygamous families forced to file as unmarried individuals 
would pay the same amount as unmarried individuals, and more than 
dyadic married couples with similar income. This higher tax bill could 
potentially prejudice low-income polygamous families with a single 
earner. 
IV. TAX DISCRIMINATION AND FAIRNESS 
Once a state legalizes polygamy, the federal government will need to 
determine how to deal with polygamous taxpayers. Until recently, of 
course, the federal treatment of polygamy was clearly moot: DOMA 
prevented the federal government from recognizing any marriage other 
than dyadic opposite-sex marriages, including polygamous marriage.
142
 On 
July 26, 2013, the Supreme Court held Section 3 of DOMA 
unconstitutional.
143
 
Looking at the effects of DOMA on same-sex marriages continues to 
be instructive, however, in spite of the Supreme Court‘s decision. In the 
first instance, DOMA may still apply to polygamous marriage. Justice 
Kennedy, in his majority opinion, explicitly limits the scope of the holding 
to ―those lawful marriages.‖144 The predicate to ―those‖ appears to be 
―persons who are joined in same-sex marriages made lawful by the 
State.‖145 Though the opinion never refers to polygamy, if it only applies 
to lawful same-sex marriage, DOMA may still apply to a future legal 
polygamous marriage. 
Even if the Windsor decision entirely eliminates Section 3 of DOMA, 
though, it leaves room for the government to pass a DOMA-like statute 
preventing the federal recognition of polygamous marriage. One 
significant reason the Court finds DOMA unconstitutional is because 
 
 
 141. See infra Part V.A. 
 142. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) (―[T]he word ‗marriage‘ means only a legal union between one man and 
one woman as husband and wife . . . .‖). 
 143. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695–96 (2013) (holding Section 3 of DOMA 
unconstitutional). 
 144. Id. at 2696. 
 145. Id. at 2695. This is Justice Scalia‘s understanding, as well, in the dissent: ―The penultimate 
sentence of the majority‘s opinion is a naked declaration that ‗[t]his opinion and its holding are 
confined‘ to those couples ‗joined in same-sex marriages made lawful by the State.‘‖ Id. at 2709 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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―[t]he principal purpose is to impose inequality, not for other reasons like 
governmental efficiency.‖146 Though the Court does not say as much, it 
implies that, if the government had a legitimate purpose, it could refuse to 
recognize state-sanctioned marriages. And, given the complications 
polygamy would create in a system designed with dyadic marriage in 
mind, the government could likely show efficiency reasons to refuse to 
recognize polygamous marriages.
147
 
Even though Congress arguably could refuse to recognize polygamy 
for federal purposes, if polygamy becomes legal in one or more states, 
Congress should not attempt to use the tax law to show its disapproval of 
polygamy. Already the tax law‘s refusal to recognize same-sex marriage 
has led to harms, both to gay taxpayers and to the tax system, and its 
systematic refusal to recognize polygamous marriage would result in 
similar harms.  
Special treatment of certain groups of taxpayers will inevitably 
disadvantage other taxpayers.
148
 This implicit discrimination may be 
justified in certain circumstances.
149
 Still, the principal purpose of the tax 
law is to raise revenue for the government in a fair manner.
150
 Without a 
compelling tax justification, the tax law should avoid discrimination and, 
instead, strive to treat similarly situated taxpayers alike.
151
 
One legitimate reason for tax discrimination is to prevent and to punish 
undesirable activities. For example, the tax law can explicitly prevent 
taxpayers from reducing their incomes in certain ways;
152
 alternatively, it 
can create an unfavorable result in the hopes of discouraging revenue-
 
 
 146. Id. at 2709. 
 147. See infra Part V. 
 148. JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN‘S GUIDE TO THE DEBATE 
OVER TAXES 88 (4th ed. 2008) (―A family benefits from the whole system of tax breaks only if it 
receives more of them than other families at the same income level receive. . . . [S]ome people benefit 
and others lose.‖). 
 149. Id. at 89–90. 
 150. Richard M. Bird & Eric M. Zolt, Redistribution via Taxation: the Limited Role of the 
Personal Income Tax in Developing Countries, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1627, 1630 (2005) (―[T]he main 
reason for a tax system is to allocate the cost of government in some fair way.‖). 
 151. LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND JUSTICE 165 
(2002) (―Insofar as these [goals] are legitimate goals of government, there is a case for the tax 
provisions that serve them, even if they are ‗discriminatory.‘‖). And even then, there may be ―some 
forms of tax discrimination [that are] just wrong in themselves, apart from their implications for 
economic justice or other legitimate social goals.‖ Id. at 166. 
 152. For example, if a taxpayer acquires control of a corporation for the principal purpose of 
evading tax through a deduction, credit, or other allowance, the I.R.S. can disregard a taxpayer‘s 
putative deduction, credit, or other allowance. I.R.C. § 269(a) (2006). 
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reducing actions.
153
 In addition, the tax law can penalize those who decide 
to engage in disfavored acts. It penalizes taxpayers who underreport their 
income,
154
 who fail to file returns,
155
 and even those who bounce their 
checks when they pay their taxes.
156
 Taxpayers who engage in tax shelter 
transactions intended to illegally evade taxes must disclose their 
participation and, if they fail to disclose, face stiff penalties.
157
  
Most of the undesirable activities that the tax law prevents or 
discourages relate to the tax law‘s revenue-raising provisions. But in 
certain cases, Congress has used the tax law to discourage behaviors not 
related to tax. The tax law may be uniquely situated to address certain non-
revenue-related harms; for example, the tax law can discourage certain 
activities that create negative externalities by forcing a taxpayer to 
internalize the costs of those activities.
158
  
Accordingly, absent the requisite negative externality worthy of 
internalizing or a tax evasion predicate, the tax law should not penalize a 
taxpayer‘s family structure. The tax law should minimize the ways in 
which it treats people differently.
159
 But using it to disapprove of certain 
types of marriage—including same-sex marriage and polygamy—serves 
no revenue-related purposes.
160
 Because a taxpayer‘s marriage does not 
implicate tax evasion, the tax law‘s disapproval of same-sex and 
polygamous marriage does not discourage tax-evasive behavior. 
 
 
 153. For example, some taxpayers would defer—possibly indefinitely—their payment of taxes by 
investing through a tax haven corporation. See Craig M. Boise, Breaking Open Offshore Piggybanks: 
Deferral and the Utility of Amnesty, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 667, 683 (2007). Rather than prohibiting 
taxpayers‘ use of tax havens, the Kennedy administration enacted the subpart F income rules, which 
taxed certain persons trying take advantage of tax havens on the income earned by the tax haven 
corporation, even if they did not currently receive that money. Id. at 684. Although U.S. taxpayers 
could still invest through tax havens, these rules made such investment less attractive. 
 154. I.R.C. § 6662(a) (2006). 
 155. I.R.C. § 6651(a)(1) (2006 & Supp. V 2012). 
 156. I.R.C. § 6657 (2006 & Supp. V 2012). 
 157. I.R.C. § 6707A(a) (2006); see Samuel D. Brunson, Repatriating Tax-Exempt Investments: 
Tax Havens, Blocker Corporations, and Unrelated Debt-Financed Income, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 225, 
266 (2012) (detailing penalties for failing to report reportable transactions). 
 158. Victor Thuronyi, The Concept of Income, 46 TAX L. REV. 45, 93 (1990). 
 159. Edward J. McCaffery, Slouching Towards Equality: Gender Discrimination, Market 
Efficiency, and Social Change, 103 YALE L.J. 595, 645 (1993) (―[A] progressive tax system affects 
different people differently, although we try to minimize the differing effects through formal concepts 
such as horizontal equity, with its mandate to treat like cases alike.‖). 
 160. Tax laws have, in fact, been used to discourage and/or penalize polygamous relationships. 
Colonial African governments imposed head taxes, under which men had to pay a set amount for each 
wife. ZEITZEN, supra note 20, at 146. As a head tax is a highly regressive form of tax, Lawrence 
Zelenak, The Puzzling Case of the Revenue-Maximizing Lottery, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1, 21 (2000), the 
colonial governments intended for this type of tax to constitute such an economic burden that 
eventually polygyny would disappear. ZEITZEN, supra note 20, at 146. In fact, it merely converted de 
jure polygamy into de facto polygyny, in some places increasing the prevalence of polygamy. Id. 
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Moreover, alternative family structures do not create externalities that 
impose costs on other taxpayers.
161
 
Penalizing these alternative family structures using the income tax is, 
therefore, unfair. And unfairness may irreparably harm the tax system, as 
taxpayers begin to lose faith in it.
162 
To the extent it refuses to recognize 
certain families, though, the tax law unfairly causes real harm to them. The 
harms to taxpayers include the psychic harms of feeling excluded, 
devalued, or even discriminated against by the larger society,
163
 in addition 
to the expense and administrative costs of paying taxes.
164
  
A. DOMA and Same-Sex Marriage 
Congress departed from the principles of fairness and 
nondiscriminatory taxation in its treatment of married same-sex couples 
under DOMA. In spite of the lack of negative externalities and revenue 
loss associated with same-sex marriage, Congress refused to recognize gay 
marriage in applying federal laws, including the federal income tax. 
Congress‘s failure to recognize same-sex couples as married for tax 
purposes has proven unfair and problematic. In essence, Congress‘s 
inaction in this regard exemplifies the institutional inappropriateness of 
using the federal tax law to discourage behavior states affirmatively 
permit.  
 
 
 161. See, e.g., Laura Langbein & Mark A. Yost, Jr., Same-Sex Marriage and Negative 
Externalities, 90 SOC. SCI. Q. 292, 305–06 (2009) (―The results above show that laws permitting same-
sex marriage or civil unions have no adverse effect on marriage, divorce, and abortion rates, the 
percent of children born out of wedlock, or the percent of households with children under 18 headed 
by women.‖). 
 162. See, e.g., Nancy J. Knauer, Heteronormativity and Federal Tax Policy, 101 W. VA. L. REV. 
129, 218 (1998). 
 163. Professor Anthony Infanti explains that, to him, as a gay man, 
My own view of the Code and its treatment of same-sex couples is necessarily colored by my 
experience of life as a gay man. The sum of this experience, which constitutes a narrative in 
its own right, casts a far less favorable light on the Code. For me, the Code is not neutral; 
rather, it appears to be just another manifestation of the fluid mixture of hostility, 
bewilderment, and discomfort that generally characterize society's reaction to homosexuality. 
From my perspective, I can't help but see the Code as another weapon for discrimination and 
oppression in society's already well-stocked arsenal. 
Anthony C. Infanti, The Internal Revenue Code as Sodomy Statute, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 763, 
767–68 (2004). See also John V. Orth, Night Thoughts: Reflections on the Debate Concerning Same-
Sex Marriage, 3 NEV. L.J. 560, 565 (2003) (―[C]ouples who cannot be legally married may feel that 
their relationship is devalued by society.‖). 
 164. Tara Siegel Bernard & Ron Lieber, The High Price of Being a Gay Couple, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
3, 2009, at A1 (―Even tax preparation can cost more, since gay couples have to file two sets of 
returns.‖). 
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In 2004, after the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts determined 
that prohibitions on same-sex marriage violated the Massachusetts 
constitution,
165
 Massachusetts became the first state to legalize same-sex 
marriage.
166
 Other states followed, and as of the date of publication, fifteen 
states and the District of Columbia permit same-sex couples to marry.
167
 In 
spite of this, the federal tax law did not recognize such couples as 
married.
168
 
The tax law‘s refusal to recognize same-sex marriage did not rest on 
any tax policy consideration. Instead, its failure to treat same-sex married 
couples in the same manner as it treated heterosexual married couples 
resulted solely from the application of DOMA, a law intended to limit the 
viability of same-sex marriages and, at the same time, to signal Congress‘s 
disapproval of such marriages.
169
 Various commentators have decried the 
application of DOMA to tax law, objecting to the inequity between 
opposite-sex and same-sex couples.  
One such inequity is that of uncertainty. Because the tax law refused to 
recognize state-sanctioned same-sex marriage, married gay taxpayers were 
left in federal tax limbo: holding a state-sanctioned marriage license that 
offered them neither guidance nor change in status for federal tax 
purposes. Because the tax law refused to acknowledge their marriages, 
same-sex married couples had to ―settle on an appropriate tax 
classification for transactions that occur[ed] within the couple.‖170 But the 
proper application of the tax law to same-sex married couples was, at best, 
uncertain.
171
 As they navigated the uncertainty, however, gay couples 
 
 
 165. Goodridge v. Dep‘t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003) (―The question before 
us is whether, consistent with the Massachusetts Constitution, the Commonwealth may deny the 
protections, benefits, and obligations conferred by civil marriage to two individuals of the same sex 
who wish to marry. We conclude that it may not.‖). 
 166. Nan D. Hunter, Introduction: The Future Impact of Same-Sex Marriage: More Questions 
Than Answers, 100 GEO. L.J. 1855, 1863 n.57 (2012). 
 167. Soumya Karlamangla, Hawaii Is 15th State to OK Gay Marriage, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 14, 
2013, at A10; Monica Davey & Steven Yaccino, Illinois Sends Bill Allowing Gay Marriage to 
Governor, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2013, at A12. In addition, on November 5, 2013, the Illinois legislature 
has passed a law legalizing same-sex marriage and has sent it to the governor, who intends to sign it. 
Id. When he signs it, Illinois will become the sixteenth state to legalize same-sex marriage. Id. 
 168. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695–96 (2013); see also supra text 
accompanying note 17.  
 169. DOMA substantively defined marriage as consisting solely of a man and a woman for federal 
purposes and authorized states to refuse to recognize same-sex marriages performed in other states. 
See, e.g., Susan R. Klein, Independent-Norm Federalism in Criminal Law, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1541, 
1561 (2002). In their public statements, however, members of Congress expressed animus toward 
same-sex marriage. See, e.g., Gill v. O.P.M., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 378 (D. Mass. 2010). 
 170. See Infanti, supra note 163, at 783. 
 171. See, e.g., Anthony C. Infanti, Tax Equity, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 1191, 1238 (2008). 
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nonetheless needed to classify their transactions correctly. If they got it 
wrong, same-sex married couples could have faced significant civil and 
criminal penalties.
172
 
Not treating married same-sex taxpayers as spouses for tax purposes 
also violated the norm of horizontal equity. Horizontal equity demands 
that similarly situated taxpayers pay similar amounts of tax.
173
 While 
horizontal equity is not the sole criterion of a fair tax system, its presence 
remains a constant across several formulations of a just tax system.
174
 
Notwithstanding the importance of horizontal equity in a just tax system, 
however, under DOMA, a same-sex married couple faced a different tax 
bill than an opposite-sex married couple with precisely the same income, 
deductions, and credits.
175
 And the lack of horizontal equity was more 
egregious for the fact that it had no tax-based justification. As a result, the 
tax law‘s refusal to recognize same-sex marriage, with its violation of 
horizontal equity, resulted in an unfair tax system. 
In addition to the various examples of unfairness to gay taxpayers 
caused by the tax law‘s refusal to recognize same-sex marriage, this 
refusal can potentially lead to bad tax results. The tax law generally 
assumes that taxpayers will act selfishly, and uses that selfishness in part 
to police bad behavior by taxpayers.
176
 In most arm‘s-length transactions, 
both parties attempt to negotiate the best deal for themselves. Usually, 
though, the best result for one party differs from—and, to some extent, 
conflicts with—the best result for the other.177 As such, the parties‘ 
 
 
 172. Id. 
 173. See Musgrave, supra note 69, at 113. 
 174. Id. at 116 (―[T]he requirement of [horizontal equity] remains essentially unchanged under the 
various formulations of distributive justice, ranging from Lockean entitlement over utilitarianism and 
fairness solutions.‖); see also Brian Galle, Tax Fairness, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1323, 1328 (2008) 
(―I argue that [horizontal equity] can be justified both by the unique purpose of the revenue function as 
well as on welfare grounds.‖). While an important goal of the tax law, however, the tax law does not 
require similarly situated taxpayers to be treated similarly in all situations. See, e.g., Hostar Marine 
Transp. Sys., Inc. v. United States, 592 F.3d 202, 210 (1st Cir. 2010) (―Despite the goal of consistency 
in treatment, the IRS is not prohibited from treating such taxpayers disparately. Rather than being a 
strict, definitive requirement, the principle of achieving parity in taxing similarly situated taxpayers is 
merely aspirational.‖). 
 175. See, e.g., Christopher T. Nixon, Should Congress Revise the Tax Code to Extend the Same 
Tax Benefits to Same-Sex Couples as are Currently Granted to Married Couples?: An Analysis in 
Light of Horizontal Equity, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 41, 44 (1998) (―As a result, the current Code continues to 
give preferential treatment to married couples as compared to same-sex couples by granting married 
couples tax benefits not granted to same-sex couples. Because of this preferential treatment, the 
current Code lacks horizontal equity and, thus, is violative of both tax and social policy.‖). 
 176. See, e.g., Seto, supra note 100, at 1538 (―The Code's general rules are written on the 
assumption that taxpayers are self-interested, unaffiliated individuals—the atomistic rationalists of the 
classic economic model.‖). 
 177. A sale represents the simplest example of this conflict. The seller wants to receive the highest 
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ultimate agreement requires some compromise and, rather than resulting in 
collusion that permits the parties to evade taxes, approximates the true 
value of their deal. In certain relationships, including familial 
relationships, the tax law relaxes this assumption of selfishness, and, as 
such, may ignore transactions that lack economic reality.
178
  
Because the tax law did not recognize same-sex couples‘ marriages as 
marriage for tax purposes, however, the tax law assumed that gay 
taxpayers would act selfishly. Where, instead, they acted altruistically, 
they could structure transactions in an abusive manner to take advantage 
of the tax law‘s assumption of selfishness.179 Imagine, for example, that a 
taxpayer purchased a share of stock for $10. The value of the stock 
subsequently falls to $5. If the taxpayer sells the stock, she can deduct her 
$5 loss.
180
 On the other hand, if she is unwilling to sell (because, for 
example, she believes the stock will appreciate), then she cannot deduct 
the loss.
181
  
If, however, she could sell the stock to someone with whom she shared 
her economic life, she could realize and deduct the loss while preserving 
control over the stock and its potential appreciation. The tax law 
recognizes that people in certain relationships, including spouses, could 
act in such an opportunistic (and altruistic) manner. To prevent these 
artificial deductions, the tax law disallows the deduction of losses on sales 
between spouses.
182
 
Finally, the federal government‘s refusal to recognize same-sex 
marriages recognized under state law violated the Constitution.
183
 The 
current constitutional regime leaves to the states the right to define 
marriage.
184
 Though defenders of DOMA argued that it did not limit state 
 
 
price possible for her asset in order to maximize her gain. The buyer, on the other hand, wants to pay 
as little as possible. Because their positions are adversarial and in conflict, the price on which they 
eventually settle should approximate an objective value for the asset. 
 178. I.R.C. § 7701(o) (2006 & Supp. V 2012) (codifying economic substance doctrine). 
 179. See, e.g., Seto, supra note 100, at 1544 (―But if my thesis is correct—one of the principal 
purposes of the related-party rules is to prevent tax-abusive transactions whenever the assumption of 
selfishness fails—then we should all be troubled by the tax-abusive consequences of not including gay 
marriage as a listed relationship automatically invoking those rules.‖). 
 180. I.R.C. § 165(a), (c)(2) (2006). 
 181. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-4(a) (1960). 
 182. I.R.C. § 267(a)(1), (b)(1), (c)(4) (2006). 
 183. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695–96 (2013). 
 184. See, e.g., Evan Wolfson & Michael F. Melcher, Constitutional and Legal Defects in the 
―Defense of Marriage‖ Act, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 221, 231 (1996) (―The Tenth Amendment, 
federalism, the absence of enumerated congressional power, and history all make clear that states, not 
the federal government, define and regulate civil marriage, subject only to U.S. constitutional 
constraints.‖). 
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definitions of marriage, but only served to create a single federal definition 
of marriage,
185
 the Supreme Court held ―that DOMA [was] 
unconstitutional as a deprivation of the liberty of the person protected by 
the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.‖186 
B. Polygamists and Tax Evasion 
The arguments in favor of the tax law‘s recognizing same-sex marriage 
would also press for its recognition of legalized polygamous marriage. 
Without such recognition, polygamists would face uncertainty, the tax law 
would violate horizontal equity, other bad tax results could follow, and the 
tax law‘s response could arguably violate the Constitution.  
Still, the possibility exists that polygamists differ fundamentally from 
other taxpayers in such a way that they deserve to be treated differently.
187
 
One way in which polygamous marriage differs significantly from same-
sex marriage in relation to tax is that nobody accuses same-sex couples of 
systemically evading taxes.
188
 Critics of polygamy, on the other hand, cite 
tax evasion among the litany of evils perpetrated by polygamists.
189
 If 
polygamists approach taxes in a way fundamentally different from other 
Americans, that would provide some justification for treating polygamous 
taxpayers differently, perhaps trumping the general fairness 
considerations. 
Do polygamists evade taxes more than other Americans? No study has 
explored polygamists‘ tax compliance. Without such empirical evidence of 
how polygamists compare with non-polygamists in their payment of taxes, 
we cannot answer the question definitively. We can, however, look at the 
 
 
 185. Gill v. O.P.M., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 391 (D. Mass. 2010). 
 186. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695. 
 187. For example, Professor Strassberg claims that the ―social and political implications‖ of same-
sex marriage differ significantly from those of polygamous marriage. Strassberg, supra note 6, at 
1615. The former she finds fundamentally democratic, while the latter she finds inherently despotic. 
Id. 
 188. This notwithstanding Professor Theodore Seto‘s documentation of tax advantages that 
committed same-sex couples can enjoy as long as the tax law does not recognize their relationship, see 
generally Seto, supra note 100, and notwithstanding Professor Anthony Infanti‘s call for civil 
disobedience by gay taxpayers. See generally Anthony C. Infanti, Homo Sacer, Homosexual: Some 
Thoughts on Waging Tax Guerrilla Warfare, 2 UNBOUND: HARVARD J. LEGAL LEFT 27, 53 (2006) 
(―To be clear, when I speak here of an ‗open‘ challenge, I contemplate the filing of returns that on 
their face challenge the current application of the tax laws to same-sex couples.‖) (emphasis in 
original). 
 189. See, e.g., Griggs, supra note 4, at A1; Vazquez, supra note 4, at 244; Davis, supra note 4, at 
1975. 
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specific accusations of tax evasion leveled against polygamists and 
evaluate the strength of these accusations‘ connection to polygamy itself.  
In general, individual U.S. taxpayers pay the taxes they owe. The I.R.S. 
estimates that, in 2001, it collected over 86 percent of the taxes that should 
have been paid.
190
 But this high level of compliance is not evenly 
distributed; instead, compliance rates vary widely, depending on the type 
of income a taxpayer earns. Taxpayers declare and pay taxes on about 99 
percent of their wages and other income subject to significant information 
reporting and withholding requirements.
191
 On the other hand, taxpayers 
only declare and pay taxes on about half of their business income, which 
often consists of cash not subject to reporting or withholding rules.
192
 And 
I.R.S. statistics indicate that taxpayers only reported and paid taxes on 28 
percent of their farm income.
193
 
Although critics of polygamy do not have data on whether and how 
polygamists evade taxes, they do provide anecdotal examples. For 
example, on July 24, 2008, the Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing 
entitled, ―Crimes Associated with Polygamy: The Need for a Coordinated 
State and Federal Response.‖194 In his introduction to the hearing, Senator 
Harry Reid explained that witnesses at the hearing would ―describe a web 
of criminal conduct that includes welfare fraud, tax evasion, massive 
corruption and strong-arm tactics to maintain what they think is the status 
quo.‖195 In the hearings, witnesses alleged that the Fundamentalist Church 
of Jesus Christ of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (―FLDS‖), one of the 
largest Mormon polygamous communities, believed in ―bleeding the 
beast,‖ meaning ―F.L.D.S. members should avoid paying taxes at all costs 
and should also apply for every possible type of government assistance 
that is available, whether they are eligible or not.‖196 
 
 
 190. I.R.S. AND U.S. DEP‘T OF THE TREASURY, REDUCING THE FEDERAL TAX GAP: A REPORT ON 
IMPROVING VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE 1 (2007) [hereinafter REDUCING THE FEDERAL TAX GAP], 
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/tax_gap_report_final_080207_linked.pdf. The I.R.S. 
calculated this compliance rate after factoring in late payments and I.R.S. enforcement actions. Id. 
 191. Id. at 14. 
 192. Susan Cleary Morse et al., Cash Businesses and Tax Evasion, 20 STAN. L. & POL‘Y REV. 37, 
39 (2009). 
 193. REDUCING THE FEDERAL TAX GAP, supra note 190, at 14. 
 194. Crimes Associated with Polygamy: The Need for a Coordinated State and Federal Response 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2008), available at http://www.gpo.gov/ 
fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110shrg44773/pdf/CHRG-110shrg44773.pdf. 
 195. Id. at 5 (Statement of Sen. Harry Reid). 
 196. Id. at 95 (Submission for the Record by Carolyn Jessop); but see id. at 50 (Testimony of Dr. 
Dan Fischer) (―While you‘ll probably gather important information related to tax fraud and welfare 
fraud, there are probably some who pay their taxes fairly and for sure there are some who are eligible 
for welfare and should be the recipients of its benefits.‖). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
144 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 91:113 
 
 
 
 
Polygamists allegedly avoid paying taxes in two ways: they claim 
credits and deductions to which they are not entitled and they fail to report 
some or all of the income they earn. For example, in the Senate Judiciary 
Committee hearing, one witness testified that ―[i]t was standard procedure 
for ‗spiritual wives‘ [i.e., plural wives not legally married to their 
husband] to list themselves as the ‗head of household‘ on their income tax 
returns for the benefit of the tax credit.‖197 This accusation is problematic, 
however, for one major reason: these plural wives probably qualify to file 
as heads of households. Filing as a ―head of household‖ entitles a tax filer 
to ―take advantage of special tax rates.‖198 A taxpayer qualifies for these 
special tax rates if, at the end of the year, she is unmarried, her dependent 
child (or children) live with her for at least half the year, and she provides 
at least half of the cost of maintaining her household.
199
 Because neither 
the states nor federal law recognizes polygamous marriage, most 
polygamous spouses are not married for tax purposes. Provided that a 
polygamous wife‘s children live with her and she provides half of their 
support, she in fact qualifies as the head of household and, by filing using 
that status, follows the tax law and does not evade her taxes. 
Critics of polygamy also claim that polygamists ―avoid income taxes 
by paying each other wages under the table.‖200 But, in light of the I.R.S.‘s 
compliance statistics, the evasion problem appears to result less from the 
taxpayers‘ status as polygamists and more from their work in less-formal 
industries.
201
 And, at least among some groups of Mormon polygamists, 
men are more likely to work in agricultural and construction jobs than is 
the surrounding population.
202
 Taxpayers in these fields tend to 
underreport their incomes in general.
203
 Critics of polygamy have not 
provided any evidence that polygamists are so different from other 
Americans that, if they worked in jobs subject to wage withholding and 
reporting, they would continue to evade taxes. Making it easier for 
polygamists to join the more-formal job market would thus likely provide 
 
 
 197. Id. at 52 (Testimony of Dr. Dan Fischer). 
 198. Adam Chase, Tax Planning for Same-Sex Couples, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 359, 385 (1995). 
 199. I.R.C. § 2(b)(1) (2006). 
 200. Griggs, supra note 4, at A1. 
 201. See Morse et al., supra note 192, at 67 (―Tax cheating follows opportunity, not complexity or 
immorality . . . .‖). 
 202. Heaton & Jacobson, supra note 7, at 157. 
 203. See, e.g., REDUCING THE FEDERAL TAX GAP, supra note 190, at 13 (72 percent net 
misreporting percentage for farm income). 
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a better solution to their tax evasion than refusing to recognize their 
marriages for tax purposes.
204
 
Then, should polygamy become legal, Congress‘s historic failure to 
treat same-sex marriages equitably under the tax law would fail to justify 
its continued refusal to acknowledge and deal with polygamy for tax 
purposes. Refusing to provide rules for polygamous families would create 
the same inequities, uncertainties, and opportunities for abuse that refusing 
to acknowledge the marriages of same-sex couples did. At the same time, 
it would do nothing to prevent polygamists‘ alleged tax-evasive behavior. 
V. FILING SOLUTIONS 
The current absence of legal polygamy in the United States poses a 
significant impediment to designing a tax regime that can handle 
polygamous taxpayers. Although supporters call polygamy the ―next civil 
rights battle,‖205 no state has made any serious move toward recognizing, 
legalizing, or even decriminalizing it. Even assuming polygamy gains the 
necessary critical mass of cultural and political acceptance, the legal 
framework that would underlie legalized polygamy remains a mystery. 
Given the differences between the various groups that practice 
polygamy—and the basic structural difference between polygamy on the 
one hand and both traditional and non-traditional dyadic marriages on the 
other—it remains unclear how polygamous families would function, 
legally or economically. 
Still, even without a clear idea of how legalized polygamy would look 
or when it would arrive, a number of important considerations justify 
asking the second-generation question of how the tax law could 
accommodate polygamous taxpayers for at least two reasons. As a 
practical matter, when and if polygamy becomes legal, polygamous 
 
 
 204. Legalizing—or even just decriminalizing—polygamy could help polygamists transition into 
the formal economy. Currently, polygamy is against the law in many states. And polygamists may 
justifiably believe that, if the state notices them, it will prosecute them. For example, ―David O. 
Leavitt, the Juab County prosecutor . . ., said he had not heard of Tom Green [a polygamist] until he 
saw him several years ago on a television talk show, discussing his life. To Mr. Leavitt, . . . it was an 
admission of guilt worth pursuing.‖ Michael Janofsky, Trial Opens in Rare Case of a Utahan Charged 
With Polygamy, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2001, at A12. And, more recently, shortly after a reality 
television show featuring polygamist Kody Brown and his family began to air, Utah law enforcement 
officials announced ―that the family was under investigation for violating the state law prohibiting 
polygamy.‖ John Schwartz, Polygamist, Under Scrutiny in Utah, Plans Suit to Challenge Law, N.Y, 
TIMES, July 12, 2011, at A10. There is no guarantee, however, that polygamists would want to join 
mainstream American culture, even if mainstream culture were to accept them. 
 205. Davis, supra note 4, at 1957 (quoting Polygamy=Marriage, PRO-POLYGAMY, http://www.pro 
-polygamy.com) (last visited by Davis on Sept. 10, 2010). 
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families will immediately need to file tax returns and pay taxes. Although 
Congress could determine how such families should file and pay their 
taxes after a state legalized polygamy, it would have a limited amount of 
time to do so. Moreover, if the discussion of tax and other rules governing 
the interaction of polygamous families and the outside culture occur at the 
same time as the discussion of rules governing such families‘ internal 
dynamics, the rules can be better tailored to polygamists‘ unique 
experiences and needs. 
Further, even without legalized polygamy, up to 150,000 polygamists 
live in the United States.
206
 Although neither federal nor state governments 
legally recognize their relationships, those relationships provide the best 
determinant of their appropriate taxpaying unit. Commentators urge that 
the tax law recognize relationships beyond heterosexual marriages for 
purposes of determining tax liability,
207
 and, by treating some civil unions 
as marriage for tax purposes, the government has made tentative steps 
toward doing so.
208
 To the extent this trend continues, and the tax law 
looks at actual, rather than legal, relationships, it will need to deal with 
polygamous families, even without legalized polygamy. 
Even if polygamy never becomes legal and the tax law does not look to 
substantive, rather than merely formal, relationships, considering how the 
tax law would treat polygamous families provides a new and instructive 
perspective on tax policy. All policy discussions about joint filing for 
married couples have assumed a baseline of dyadic couples. Whether the 
couple in question was of the same or opposite gender, in a legally-
sanctioned relationship or not, whether they shared their income and assets 
or not, the stakes did not change. But adding one or more partners to the 
taxable unit raises the stakes, potentially increasing both the benefits and 
burdens of the joint filing system. Even without polygamy, such new 
perspective may help to crystallize the benefits and burdens of joint filing. 
In order to propose a series of potential tax regimes, and to analyze 
their pros and cons, this Article must make certain assumptions. First, the 
potential solutions proposed in this Article assume either that at least one 
state legalizes and regulates polygamous marriage or that the tax law 
recognizes relationships beyond state-sanctioned marriage.
209
 Second, the 
 
 
 206. See supra notes 112–15 and accompanying text. 
 207. See supra notes 105–08 and accompanying text. 
 208. See supra note 90. 
 209. There may be reasons to prefer the tax law to recognize only state-sanctioned relationships, 
in spite of the unfairness such treatment imposes. Treating polygamists whose marriages are not 
recognized by a state as married for tax purposes could present both political and administrative 
problems. Without some sort of officially-sanctioned and recorded relationship, the process of 
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proposed solutions assume a certain type of polygamous relationship. 
Although providing an individualized tax system tailored to each family 
would perhaps create the fairest system, doing so would add unnecessary 
complexity to the tax law and would be virtually unadministrable. People 
who enter into polygamous marriages do so with different motivations, 
and polygamous families differ in interpersonal and economic 
configurations.
210
  
Thus, the proposed regimes assume that a polygamous marriage is 
structured in a hub-and-spoke configuration. The hub-and-spoke model 
posits polygamy as a series of dyadic relationships between the ―hub‖ 
spouse (in polygyny, the husband) and each individual spoke (in 
polygyny, the wives).
211
 Admittedly, there are other possible structures for 
polygamous marriage, including group marriage and other variants of 
interrelationships.
212
 But many, and perhaps most, polygamist marriages in 
the United States fit into the hub-and-spoke model, making this a practical 
and logical underlying assumption.
213
 
 
 
determining the economic reality of a polygamous family would require significant I.R.S. resources, 
and would likely also require intrusive verification of the facts of the polygamous relationship. 
Ultimately, it may be preferable to recognize chosen families, or to otherwise take into account a 
broader definition of family in dealing with the tax law. But the question of whether the tax law should 
recognize a non-state-sanctioned family is beyond the scope of this Article; electivity in the tax law 
can create its own problems, both for the taxpayer and the government. See, e.g., Heather M. Field, 
Choosing Tax: Explicit Elections as an Element of Design in the Federal Income Tax System, 47 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 21, 26 (2010) (―While there is not an extensive body of literature explaining the 
aversion to the use of explicit elections, scholars‘ discomfort with the use of tax elections is not 
surprising given that explicit elections raise many of the same normative concerns as general tax 
planning opportunities, which have garnered a substantial amount of academic attention. The 
availability of tax planning opportunities is criticized as complex, costly, wasteful, revenue reducing, 
and inequitable, and these critiques may resonate particularly strongly in the context of explicit 
elections.‖) (footnotes omitted). I intend to address issues of electivity as it relates to the taxation of 
non-traditional families in a future article. 
 210. See ZEITZEN, supra note 20, at 182 (―Polygamy is not a monolithic mould that people fill, 
but takes shape from the way people practice it. Like all societal institutions, it can be manipulated to 
fit the needs and purposes of its practitioners.‖). This variation exists, not only internationally, but also 
between polygamists in the same social and religious groups. ―There is . . . the same wide variety of 
polygamous family patterns in today‘s [fundamentalist Mormon] plural marriages as there was in the 
nineteenth century.‖ Id. at 100. 
 211. Davis, supra note 4, at 2017.  
 212. See, e.g., Diane J. Klein, Plural Marriage and Community Property Law, 41 GOLDEN GATE 
U. L. REV. 33, 49 (2010) (―Asymmetric polygamy and group marriage would both be legal if bigamy 
were decriminalized, and they would probably cover a significant fraction of the actual arrangements 
people might desire. But they do not exhaust the possibilities. Although these two arrangements are 
‗scalable‘ for groups of four or more persons, there are also distinctive forms for larger groups.‖) 
(footnote omitted). 
 213. See, e.g., id. at 46–47 (―This asymmetric model, when instantiated by one husband with 
multiple wives, is what is most commonly meant by those using the term ‗polygamy.‘ It is the model 
adopted by those for whom these marriage practices have a strong customary foundation, even a 
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In addition, the proposed solutions assume that some degree of 
economic unity exists in polygamist marriages. This assumption may 
prove controversial; questions remain about whether spouses in dyadic 
marriages truly split income and assets and otherwise act as an economic 
unit.
214
 Nonetheless, the evidence suggests that, while not all spouses pool 
all of their income, a significant portion of spouses pool at least some of 
their income.
215
 Similarly, while it is likely some polygamous spouses do 
not act as economic units, a significant portion pool the spouses‘ income 
(whether as dyads or collectively) and allocate it between the spouses.
216
 
As long as the tax law treats dyadic marriages as economic units, it is 
difficult to justify treating polygamous marriages otherwise. Moreover, if 
a community property state legalized polygamous marriage, presumably 
the spouses‘ income and property would become income and property of 
the marital unit. In that case, the tax law would be forced to confront the 
appropriate taxation of polygamous families.
217
 
The rest of this Part will present five potential tax regimes that could 
account for polygamous relationships.
218
 Because of the tensions inherent 
in a progressive tax system that looks for marriage neutrality and 
recognizes income pooling,
219
 no solution is perfect. Instead, each involves 
 
 
religious mandate, including FLDS and independent Mormon polygamists, some Muslims, and some 
Africans.‖) (footnotes omitted); see also Davis, supra note 4, at 2017 (―This is a radically different 
proposition from the way many polygamists currently practice plural marriage in the United States, 
conceiving it in effect as a series of legal dyads, each of which runs through the husband, like spokes 
around the hub of a wheel.‖). 
 214. See supra notes 84–85 and accompanying text. 
 215. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
 216. Irwin Altman, Polygamous Family Life: The Case of Contemporary Mormon 
Fundamentalists, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 367, 389. 
 217. Cf. I.R.S. Chief Couns. Mem. 200608038 (Feb. 24, 2006) (holding that, in light of 
California‘s extension of community property rules to domestic partners, each partner was required to 
report and pay taxes on half of the community income). 
 218. Especially in light of Professor Davis‘s recommendation that states base their default rules 
for polygamous marriage on commercial partnership law, see Davis, supra note 4, at 1959 and supra 
text accompanying note 10, it is tempting to provide a sixth possible treatment: treating polygamous 
spouses as a partnership or other business entity for tax purposes. But treating families as entities for 
tax purposes would not necessarily be fair or simple; in fact, the partnership tax rules are so 
complicated that ―partnership tax experts expend considerable time and energy mastering‖ them. 
Bradley T. Borden, The Allure and Illusion of Partners’ Interests in a Partnership, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 
1077, 1083 (2011). The potential need to consult tax experts places a heavy burden to put on 
individuals who just want to pay their taxes. Moreover, ultimately, individuals, not entities, pay 
income taxes, even where the entity is the nominal taxpayer. George K. Yin, The Taxation of Private 
Business Enterprises: Some Policy Questions Stimulated by the ―Check-the-Box‖ Regulations, 51 
SMU L. REV. 125, 139 (1997) (―Despite the nominal incidence of the tax on the business, some people 
will still pay it; we just will not know who.‖). Rather than solving the problems of whom and how 
much to tax, then, imposing entity taxation would merely push those questions back one step. 
 219. See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text. 
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tradeoffs between competing policy goals. In analyzing the pros and cons 
of each regime, I conclude that a mandatory individual filing regime that 
takes familial relationships into account would provide the fairest 
treatment of all taxpayers.
220
 Given the current unlikeliness of the United 
States abandoning joint filing, however, I offer a second-best, attainable 
solution: a balkanized joint filing regime. Taking into account the practical 
realities and entrenchment of joint filing, my proposal for balkanized joint 
filing constitutes the fairest and most administrable way for a joint filing 
system to accommodate polygamy.
221
 
A. Refuse to Recognize Polygamous Marriage 
As one possible solution, the government could maintain the status 
quo, refusing to recognize polygamous spouses for tax law purposes. On 
its face, this would appear to be the easiest solution: among other things, it 
would not require any change to current practice. Under current law, a 
husband and wife are permitted to file a joint tax return.
222
 In general, the 
tax law recognizes as spouses, couples who were married under state law 
as of December 31 of the year in question.
223
 No state currently recognizes 
polygamous marriages,
224
 meaning that currently, polygamists cannot 
generally file joint tax returns.
225
 
The federal government‘s refusal to treat legalized polygamous 
relationships as marriage for tax purposes would harm polygamous 
families in certain ways. By treating polygamous spouses as atomized 
individuals, in many cases, such families‘ tax liabilities would not reflect 
the economic reality of their lives. In families where some spouses earned 
the majority of the family income, while other spouses earned little or no 
income, the family unit would be overtaxed relative to a family of the 
same size and income where all of the spouses earned similar amounts, 
violating the norm of horizontal equity. 
 
 
 220. See infra Part V.E. 
 221. See infra Part V.D. 
 222. I.R.C. § 6013(a) (2006). 
 223. I.R.C. § 7703(a)(1) (2006); Toni Robinson & Mary Moers Wenig, Marry in Haste, Repent at 
Tax Time: Marital Status as a Tax Determinant, 8 VA. TAX REV. 773, 792–93 (1989).  
 224. Elizabeth Warner, Behind the Wedding Veil: Child Marriage As a Form of Trafficking in 
Girls, 12 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL‘Y & L. 233, 245 (2004) (―[P]olygamy is illegal in Utah as it is in 
every other state.‖). 
 225. In a polygynous household, where the husband and first wife had legally married, they could 
file a joint return. Because none of the other marriages would be recognized under state or federal law, 
however, none of the other wives would be eligible to file a joint return. 
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Moreover, by refusing to recognize a state-sanctioned relationship, the 
tax law would reinforce the second-class nature of polygamous families.
226
 
Even if the majority of Americans consider polygamists second-class 
citizens,
227
 their disapproval should not impact the appropriate tax 
treatment of such families.
228
  
In addition, the tax law‘s failure to recognize polygamous relationships 
essentially would require polygamists to make difficult filing decisions. 
Because the tax law would not recognize polygamists‘ marriages, they 
would not be permitted to disregard property flows and other transactions 
between themselves; instead, they would need to figure out how to 
characterize all of the transactions between spouses over the previous 
year.
229
 The need to document every transaction that occurred between 
family members, and paying taxes on those transactions, would penalize 
families for acting like families. 
The tax law‘s nonrecognition of polygamous marriage does not entirely 
prevent polygamists from filing joint returns. In many current polygamist 
families, the first marriage is a legal civil marriage, while subsequent 
marriages ―are not performed by publicly authorized officials or 
documented in civil records.‖230 The initial couple, married under state 
law, must file tax returns as married persons, not as single persons, 
whether they file jointly or separately. But any subsequent spouse must 
file as an unmarried individual, because the subsequent marriages are not 
legal under state law. 
Permitting one dyad to file jointly does nothing to resolve the 
inequities the other spouses face as a result of separate filing. Moreover, if 
polygamy were legal, permitting one dyad to file jointly while requiring 
all other spouses to file as single taxpayers would create more complexity 
than currently exists. If all spouses were legally married, the tax law 
would have to determine which dyad could file jointly, and whether the 
dyad could change from year to year, or at some other periodic interval. 
Any electivity introduced into the system, moreover, would increase the 
 
 
 226. Cf. Infanti, supra note 188, at 28 (―Completing my federal income tax return reminds me that 
the government has singled out for condemnation my partner and me, my sister and her partner, and 
every other lesbian and gay man in the United States.‖). 
 227. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 228. See supra Part IV.A. 
 229. See infra note 273 and accompanying text; cf. Infanti, supra note 188, at 28 (―In tax limbo, 
members of lesbian and gay couples are told what they are not (i.e., married), but they are never told 
what they are (and, concomitantly, how they should report transactions between them).‖) (emphasis in 
original). 
 230. ALTMAN & GINAT, supra note 138, at 132. 
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chances of inequity, with polygamous families choosing which dyad filed 
jointly and thus determining what arrangement would result in the lowest 
collective tax obligation. 
B. Treat the Entire Polygamous Family as an Economic Unit 
Rather than refusing to recognize polygamous marriages for tax 
purposes, Congress could instead decide to treat all polygamous spouses 
as a single economic unit.
231
 Polygamous spouses would elect whether to 
file joint or separate tax returns and would pay taxes at the same marginal 
tax rates as dyadic married couples. 
Although the tax law does not currently permit more than two people to 
file a joint return, it does, in certain circumstances, treat more than two 
people as the appropriate taxpaying unit. The ―kiddie tax,‖ for example, 
does not literally require children to file a joint return with their parents.
232
 
However, it taxes a child‘s ―unearned income‖ at her parents‘ top marginal 
tax rate if doing so would result in a higher tax liability for the child.
233
 
Although technically the child files her own return (and, as a result, 
escapes joint and several liability with her parents), the tax law 
nonetheless treats her as being part of an economic unit with her parents 
for purposes of her unearned income.
234
 
Permitting all polygamous spouses to file a joint return would provide 
certain benefits over ignoring polygamy altogether. Doing so would not 
attempt to illegitimize a relationship that one or more states had approved. 
It would permit polygamists to disregard transfers of property and the 
performance of services within the family, easing their administrative 
burden and potentially improving horizontal equity in relation to their 
dyadic peers. Additionally, it would not present significant administrative 
challenges to the I.R.S. The I.R.S. would have to make minimal changes 
to Form 1040—the form would need to have space for more than two 
spouses—but otherwise, permitting all spouses to file a joint return would 
not require significant alteration of current tax law and practice. 
 
 
 231. This, and any other solution that would recognize polygamy for tax purposes, would require 
either that the Supreme Court‘s decision in Windsor declaring DOMA unconstitutional apply to 
polygamy, as well, or that Congress affirmatively repeal or amend DOMA with respect to polygamous 
marriages. 
 232. It does provide the option, however, for children to include the income that would be subject 
to the kiddie tax on their parents‘ return. I.R.C. § 1(g)(7) (West 2013). 
 233. I.R.C. § 1(g)(1). 
 234. See Brunson, supra note 21, at 467. 
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However, nakedly treating polygamous spouses in the same manner as 
dyadic spouses also raises significant fairness issues. Such treatment 
violates the norm of horizontal equity. Horizontal equity requires that 
similarly situated taxpayers should be treated similarly for tax purposes.
235
 
And, although a two-person marriage and a five-person marriage are both 
families (and, potentially, economic units), the additional three spouses 
create real differences between the two families. In 2009, the median U.S. 
household earned about $50,000.
236
 Such a family would presumably fall 
into the middle class. A five-person marriage that also earned $50,000, 
however, would have a much lower standard of living. The family would 
have to split the $50,000 between five adults, rather than just two, while 
requiring more expenditure for basics such as food, clothing, and 
housing.
237
 Still, under this regime, the five-person polygamous family 
would pay approximately the same amount in taxes as the two-person 
family.
238
 Even as an economic unit, polygamous marriage differs 
qualitatively, and not just quantitatively, from dyadic marriage, and 
treating them identically does not advance horizontal equity. 
Moreover, requiring a polygamous family to file joint returns would 
exacerbate the secondary-earner problem.
239
 With a joint return, only one 
person‘s income can absorb the lower tax rates. The secondary earner pays 
taxes at the primary earner‘s top rate on her first dollar of income. With a 
polygamous family, the tertiary earner would then start paying taxes at the 
top rate of the secondary earner. Each spouse would face an increasing 
disincentive to work, as she had less after-tax income from her first earned 
dollar. Not only that: as the collective income increased, the family would 
begin to face phaseouts of deductions and other tax benefits, increasing the 
cost to the family of additional earners.
240
 Joint returns, with their stacked 
brackets, are, then, antithetical to polygamous families, with their several 
spouses.  
 
 
 235. Richard Schmalbeck, Income Averaging After Twenty Years: A Failed Experiment in 
Horizontal Equity, 1984 DUKE L.J. 509, 547. 
 236. Amanda Noss, Household Income for States: 2008 and 2009, AM. CMTY. SURVEY BRIEFS 4 
(Sept. 2010), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2010pubs/acsbr09-2.pdf. 
 237. This example does not take children into account. In theory, the couple could have five 
children, while the polygamists have none. The tax law allows deductions for children, however, that 
in part offset the additional costs associate with them. 
 238. The law could ameliorate this problem by providing a generous personal exemption available 
to each of the spouses. 
 239. See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text. 
 240. Phaseouts reduce the amount of deductions a taxpayer can take as the taxpayer‘s income 
increases. Zelenak, supra note 103, at 8. 
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C. Index Tax Brackets to Family Size 
Rather than dropping polygamous taxpayers into the current dyadic 
brackets, Congress could redesign the tax brackets to accommodate 
polygamous and dyadic married taxpayers. Redesigned tax brackets could 
solve the horizontal equity problem
241
 and reduce the secondary-earner 
problem polygamous taxpayers would face using current brackets.
242
 
While requiring polygamous families to use the same tax brackets as 
dyadic couples creates these problems, if the marginal tax brackets varied 
depending on the number of spouses filing jointly, the fairness analysis 
changes. 
Varying the tax brackets based on the number of spouses would solve 
the horizontal equity problem. Assuming that the spouses pool their 
incomes,
243
 two polygamous families, each with five spouses and each 
with $50,000 of annual income, are similarly situated. The fact that in the 
first, one spouse earns the full amount, while in the second, each of the 
spouses earns $10,000, does not matter. Assuming that both families act as 
economic units, treating them the same for tax purposes comports with the 
requirements of horizontal equity. 
Moreover, expanding the size of the brackets based on the number of 
people filing jointly reduces the secondary-earner problem. Larger 
brackets would mean that a family could earn more income before 
progressing to the next marginal tax rate. While the tertiary earner still 
pays taxes on her first dollar of income at the secondary earner‘s top 
marginal rate, expanded brackets reduce the top tax rate paid by the 
secondary earner. As such, while the tertiary earner still faces some 
disincentive to work, she will keep a higher percentage of her after-tax 
income. Moreover, if this indexing to family size were carried over to 
deduction phaseouts, this could substantially reduce the secondary-earner 
problem.
244
  
However, indexing the tax brackets based on the number of spouses 
has its own problems. As an initial, significant impediment, Congress 
 
 
 241. See supra notes 236–38 and accompanying text. 
 242. See supra notes 239–40 and accompanying text. 
 243. See supra notes 214–17 and accompanying text. Although they may not actually be acting as 
economic units, it seems to be worth the inaccuracy to avoid the intrusive and administratively 
burdensome job of requiring the I.R.S. to determine (or confirm) the economics of individual families. 
 244. That is, if each additional spouse increased the amount of income a polygamous family could 
earn before losing deductions, the family could add workers without increasing its marriage penalty. 
See, e.g., Zelenak, supra note 103, at 8 (―To completely avoid marriage penalties, the threshold 
amount . . . should be twice as high for joint returns as for unmarried taxpayers.‖). 
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would need to decide how to calculate the size of the tax brackets. When 
first implemented, the tax brackets for married persons filing jointly were 
twice as large as the tax brackets for unmarried individuals.
245
 In the 
ensuing years, however, this straightforward relationship has changed. As 
illustrated in Table 1, the tax brackets for a married couple filing jointly 
currently range from twice as large as that of an unmarried person at the 
lowest tax rate to the same size at the highest tax rate.
246
 Congress would 
have to determine whether to maintain these percentage differences for 
each additional spouse, or whether to change the indexing—a significant 
administrative burden indeed.
247
 
TABLE 1
248
 
Tax 
Rate 
 
Ceiling for an 
Unmarried 
Taxpayer 
Ceiling for a 
Married Taxpayer 
Filing Jointly 
Percentage by Which 
Married Bracket 
Exceeds Unmarried 
10% $8,925 $17,850 100% 
15% $36,250 $72,500 100% 
25% $87,850 $146,400 66.7% 
28% $183,250 $223,050 21.7% 
33% $398,350 $398,350 0% 
35% $400,000 $450,000 12.5% 
39.6% Over $400,000 Over $450,000 N/A 
 
 
 245. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 246. The highest marginal tax rate begins at the same point for married and unmarried taxpayers. 
 247. Even using the same percentages would not solve all of the complexity. If Congress indexed 
the tax brackets to the number of spouses while maintaining the same ratios as currently exist, the new 
brackets might look something like this: 
Tax Rate Unmarried Two Spouses Three Spouses Four Spouses Five Spouses 
10% $8,925  $17,850  $35,700  $71,400  $142,800  
15% $36,250  $72,500  $145,000  $290,000  $580,000  
25% $87,850  $146,400  $244,049  $406,829  $678,185  
28% $183,250  $223,050  $271,452  $330,357  $402,044  
33% $398,350  $398,350  $398,350  $398,350  $398,350  
35% $400,000  $450,000  $506,250  $569,531  $640,723  
39.6% Over $400,000 Over $450,000 Over $506,250 Over $569,531 Over $640,723 
This table suggests a mathematical problem with indexing, however: because the percentage difference 
between unmarried and married taxpayers differs depending on the brackets, multiple spouses cause 
the brackets to overlap in ways that. For example, using the same percentage differences, for a family 
with four spouses, the ceiling on the 25-percent tax bracket would exceed the ceilings on the 
28-percent and the 33-percent brackets. And for a family with five spouses, the 15-percent and the 
25-percent tax bracket ceilings exceed the 28-percent and the 33-percent ceilings. As a result, 
mathematically, simply extending the percentages for each spouse would be unworkable. 
 248. Rev. Proc. 2013-15 § 2.01, 2013-5 I.R.B. 444 (2013). 
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Moreover, indexing tax brackets to the number of spouses creates 
certain fairness issues. In polygamous families where one spouse earned 
all or most of the family‘s income,249 increasing the size of tax brackets in 
relation to the number of married persons would greatly increase the 
marriage bonus. Although the five-spouse polygamous family where one 
spouse earned all $50,000 would pay approximately the same taxes as the 
five-spouse polygamous family where each spouse earned $10,000, it 
would pay significantly less in taxes than an unmarried individual, or a 
dyadic married person, who earned $50,000.  
Such a solution would also introduce additional tax-induced distortions 
into marriage decisions.
250
 Where possible, tax policymakers try to avoid 
causing distortions, because distortions ―impose[] an otherwise avoidable 
welfare cost‖ on taxpayers.251 If Congress indexed tax brackets to the 
number of spouses, polygamous spouses would face tax incentives to add 
additional low-income or no-income spouses, whether the family had a 
single earner or each spouse earned a similar income. Adding additional 
spouses would increase the size of the tax brackets under which the family 
calculated its tax liability. If the new spouse did not contribute any 
additional income, her presence as a family member would reduce the 
family‘s collective tax liability.252 
Allowing polygamous families to file joint returns, whether they use 
the tax brackets applicable to dyadic marriage or indexed brackets, raises 
other issues as well. Treating all of the spouses as a single economic unit 
may not reflect the economic reality of a polygamous marriage. Because 
the structure of polygamous marriages varies widely, designing a tax 
system that accurately reflects all polygamous families would be highly 
impractical and imprudent. Still, treating a polygamous family as a single 
economic unit assumes that all of the spouses share property and income, 
 
 
 249. Although most polygamous households need more than one person earning income, about 
half of the polygamous wives in Altman and Ginat‘s study worked roughly full-time. See ALTMAN & 
GINAT, supra note 138, at 85. This indicates that, in at least some polygamous households, some of the 
spouses are not working. 
 250. Empirical evidence suggests that tax consequences have a measurable, statistically significant 
(albeit small) impact on the probability of a person‘s marrying. James Alm & Leslie A. Whittington, 
For Love or Money? The Impact of Income Taxes on Marriage, 66 ECONOMICA 297, 299 (1999). 
 251. Michael S. Knoll, Reconsidering International Tax Neutrality, 64 TAX L. REV. 99, 100 
(2011). 
 252. For example, using the sample indexed brackets, supra note 247, a three-spouse polygamous 
family with $40,000 of income would pay $4,215 in taxes (i.e., 10 percent of their first $35,700 of 
income plus 15 percent of their remaining $4,300). If they brought in an additional spouse, however, 
who had no income, they would only pay $4,000 in taxes. Of course, there may be non-tax constraints 
that would prevent the family from marrying another spouse, including the family‘s not wanting more 
spouses and the additional cost that they would incur in supporting another spouse. 
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and that the family members function as a unified group. If this is how 
state property law treats polygamous families, it may make sense to tax 
them collectively. But if state property law allocates ownership differently, 
this collective taxation may be inappropriate. 
Congress would also need to address whether it would require all 
spouses in a polygamous family to file consistently. That is, if a five-
person marriage decided to file a joint return, would all five spouses 
necessarily file jointly? Or could four file a joint return, with one filing a 
separate return? In general, it seems unlikely that one spouse would file 
separately. If she did, both she and the spouses filing jointly would face 
higher taxes.
253
 However, if she suspected that those spouses filing jointly 
had filed an inaccurate return, she may want to file separately to avoid 
joint and several liability for the tax liability.
254
 Permitting the same 
marriage to file jointly and separately, though, would add complexity to 
the tax system. Either solution has advantages and disadvantages, but, if 
Congress chooses to adopt one, it will need to grapple with the many 
implications, distortions, and inequities that may arise—taking into 
account a fuller spectrum of interests that includes both traditional and 
non-traditional taxpaying relationships.  
D. Balkanized Filing 
Even if the tax law acknowledged polygamous marriages, Congress 
could structure joint filing in such a way that it continued to use two-
person taxpaying units. In order to both maintain the dyadic structure of 
joint filing and recognize polygamous marriages, though, Congress would 
have to make some significant, and potentially complicated, adjustments 
to the current rules. As with any other tax filing regime, these changes 
would reflect the economics of some, but not all, polygamous marriages. 
No formulation of the tax law can accurately reflect all families, however. 
 
 
 253. Imagine that each spouse earns $25,000 of taxable income. Under the hypothetical tax 
brackets proposed in this Article, see supra note 247, if the family filed a joint return for 2013, they 
would owe $12,500 in taxes. If only four filed a joint return, those four would owe $11,430 in taxes. 
The fifth spouse would file using the rates applicable to a married taxpayer filing separately. See Rev. 
Proc. 2013-15 § 2.01, 2013-5 I.R.B. 444 (2013). She would owe $3,304, for a family tax liability of 
$14,734. One spouse filing a separate return would increase the family‘s tax liability by $2,234. 
 254. The Internal Revenue Code provides that, in some situations, an eligible spouse can be 
relieved from her joint and several liability for taxes. I.R.C. § 6015(a) (2006). But few spouses manage 
to qualify for innocent spouse relief. See, e.g., Richard C.E. Beck, The Innocent Spouse Problem: Joint 
and Several Liability for Income Taxes Should Be Repealed, 43 VAND. L. REV. 317, 321 (1990) 
(―Commentators generally agree that the innocent spouse rules are overly restrictive and foreclose 
relief in many deserving cases.‖). A polygamous spouse with any doubt about the family‘s tax 
compliance may not want to rely on the availability of such innocent spouse relief. 
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At best, the tax law can aim for a regime that reflects the majority of 
polygamous families, notwithstanding some variation at the margins. 
Many, though not all, polygamous relationships in the United States are 
structured in a hub-and-spoke pattern.
255
 In a polygynous household, this 
means that one man is simultaneously married to more than one woman, 
but the women are not married to each other.
256
 If the tax law assumed 
such a marital structure, it could treat a polygamous family as a collection 
of dyadic economic units, the hub spouse and each spoke spouse 
separately deciding whether to file jointly. Ultimately, even for 
polygamous families, only couples would file joint returns.  
Balkanizing the polygamous family for filing purposes would permit 
the tax system to recognize polygamy without requiring any fundamental 
change to current joint filing. Although it would force square polygamous 
taxpayers into the round hole of dyadic marriage, no proposal can reflect 
the economics of all families, let alone all polygamous families. Moreover, 
although balkanized filing ignores the unique qualities of the polygamous 
taxpayer, it validates polygamous marriage by recognizing it. 
Merely dropping balkanized polygamous couples into the current joint 
filing world does not provide for tax justice, however. Making balkanized 
filing fair requires some changes to existing joint filing. Specifically, 
balkanized filing would have to determine how to treat the hub spouse. 
There are two broad ways in which a balkanized joint filing system could 
treat the hub spouse‘s income. It could require him257 to include his full 
income in each dyad or it could allow him to split his income among the 
various dyads. 
As for the first option, forcing the hub spouse to include his full income 
on each joint return he filed would be unjust. The hub spouse would pay 
taxes multiple times on the same income, potentially leaving him with 
little or no after-tax income. In fact, requiring him to include the same 
income on several tax returns could result in his paying taxes at a rate in 
excess of 100 percent.
258
 In any event, he would pay a significantly larger 
 
 
 255. See supra notes 211–13. 
 256. See ZEITZEN, supra note 20, at 9 (―Polygyny is a form of plural marriage in which a man is 
permitted more than one wife.‖) (emphasis in original). Contrast polygynous or polyandrous marriage 
with group marriage, where each spouse is married to every other spouse. See id. at 12 (―Group 
marriage is a polygamous marriage form in which several men and women have sexual access to one 
another and consider themselves married to all other members of the group.‖) (emphasis in original). 
 257. In a polyandrous relationship, of course, the hub spouse would be a woman. But because the 
vast majority of polygamous relationships in the United States are polygynous, this Article refers to 
the husband as the hub spouse. 
 258. If each dyad paid taxes at a 25-percent rate, and the hub spouse earned $100,000, his after-tax 
income would depend on how many spouses he had. With one spouse, he would pay $25,000 and have 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
158 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 91:113 
 
 
 
 
percentage of his income in taxes than an unmarried individual or a person 
in a dyadic marriage with the same income. 
The tax law could resolve this double taxation problem. For instance, it 
could provide him with a tax credit for taxes paid on other returns.
259
 But 
such a solution creates additional problems. The tax law would have to 
determine on which joint return he had to pay the tax, and on which 
returns he would get the credit. The dyad that did not get the credit would 
face a higher tax bill. While this would not violate any fairness norm if the 
family pooled all of its income and assets, the balkanized filing treats a 
polygamous family as if it only pools its assets and income in the various 
dyads. Thus, for the dyad not receiving the credit, the balkanized system 
would treat that dyad significantly worse than the others. Moreover, even 
if the family did pool all of its assets, presumably a balkanized joint filing 
regime would only impose joint and several liability between the hub 
spouse and the spoke spouse with whom he filed. If the hub spouse lied on 
one tax return, the spoke spouse with whom he did not take the tax credit 
would be subject to additional taxes, even if she subsequently exited the 
marriage.
260
 
To avoid these problems, the tax law could instead adjust the marginal 
tax brackets applicable to polygamous taxpayers. Such adjustments would 
be significantly different, and less administratively burdensome, however, 
than the adjustments necessary to index the tax brackets to the size of the 
family.
261
 Essentially, a hub spouse would split his income pro rata 
between each of his wives.
262
 At the same time, the applicable brackets 
would be multiplied by a fraction, determined by the number of returns 
that would be filed. 
Specifically, in order to determine the tax brackets applicable to a 
balkanized tax return, each tax bracket would be multiplied by (n+1)/2n, 
 
 
$75,000 of after-tax income. But, under a balkanized system that required him to include his full 
income on every return, with two spouses, he would have to include the $100,000 on two tax returns, 
and would pay $25,000 on each return, leaving him with $50,000 of after-tax income. If he had four 
spouses, he would pay his full $100,000 in taxes, and with five, he would owe $125,000 of taxes on 
his $100,000 of income. 
 259. Such a tax credit could be modeled on the foreign tax credit, which provides taxpayers a 
credit against their U.S. income tax for foreign income taxes they paid. I.R.C. § 901 (2006). 
 260. Christian, supra note 88, at 576 (―Under joint and several liability, . . . a wife can be held 
liable for the tax of her former husband for tax years in which they filed jointly even if the couple has 
since divorced and executed a final property settlement agreement.‖). 
 261. See supra Part V.C. 
 262. Alternatively, he could allocate his income differently between each wife, but this would 
create unnecessary complexity and would provide him with the ability to reduce his tax liability 
unfairly, allocating the most income to the wife with the least, so that no dyad paid taxes in a higher 
bracket than any other dyad. 
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where n = the number of returns the polygamous family files.
263
 
Effectively, this leaves half of the bracket the same as it would be in the 
case of a joint return by a non-polygamous couple. That half represents the 
income earned by the spoke spouse, all of which will be on the joint return 
in question. The other half of the tax bracket represents income of the hub 
spouse, which he divides evenly between all of the spouses. The half of 
the bracket attributable to the hub spouse must be divided evenly among 
all spouses. 
To make the proposal more concrete, imagine a polygynous family 
with one husband, Henry, and four wives, Abby, Becky, Cathy, and Dora. 
In 2013, Henry has $40,000 of taxable income. Abby has $80,000 of 
taxable income, Becky has $35,000, Cathy has $15,000, and Dora does not 
earn any taxable income that year. The family will file four joint returns, 
and Henry will include $10,000 of income on each return. Table 2 
provides the 2013 tax brackets applicable to income of married taxpayers 
filing jointly. 
TABLE 2
264
 
Income Tax Rate 
Up to $17,850 10 percent 
Over $17,850 but not over $72,500 15 percent 
Over $72,500 but not over $146,400 25 percent 
Over $146,400 but not over $223,050 28 percent 
Over $223,050 but not over $398,350 33 percent 
Over $398,350 but not over 450,000 35 percent 
Over 450,000 39.6 percent 
 
In determining their tax liability, Henry and his family would multiply 
each income amount by 5/8.
265
 Table 3 provides the adjusted tax brackets 
that would apply to each of the four dyads of Henry‘s family. With 
$90,000 of taxable income on their joint return, Henry and Abby would be 
in the 28-percent tax bracket. Henry and Becky, with $45,000, would be in 
the 25-percent tax bracket. Henry‘s and Cathy‘s $25,000 taxable income 
 
 
 263. Note that n will always equal the number of people in the polygamous marriage minus one. 
This is because the hub spouse would file a joint return with each spoke spouse, but no return by 
himself. 
 264. Rev. Proc. 2013-15 § 2.01, 2013-5 I.R.B. 444 (2013). 
 265. Because they will file four returns, n = 4. Therefore, (n+1)/2n = 5/8. 
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would put them in the 15-percent tax bracket, and Henry‘s and Dora‘s 
$10,000 of taxable income would put them in the 10-percent tax bracket. 
TABLE 3
266
 
Income Tax Rate 
Up to $11,156 10 percent 
Over $11,156 but not over $45,313 15 percent 
Over $45,313 but not over $91,500 25 percent 
Over $91,500 but not over $139,406 28 percent 
Over $139,406 but not over $248,969 33 percent 
Over $248,969 but not over $281,250 35 percent 
Over $281,250 39.6 percent 
 
This version of the balkanized tax brackets has some significant 
advantages over other possible ways of treating polygamous families. Just 
like the first balkanized filing proposal presented above, this option also 
recognizes the state-sanctioned relationship, and does not cause the 
psychic harms attendant to disregarding the marriages. Moreover, by 
treating polygamous marriage as a series of dyads, it corresponds to the 
economics of at least some polygamous families. In addition, although the 
brackets must be adjusted, the adjustment is formulary, and is based on the 
standard brackets applicable to dyadic marriages. As such, the Treasury 
Department would not have to determine the appropriate tax brackets 
applicable to polygamous families, either initially or on an ongoing basis. 
And, as opposed to the first balkanized proposal, this option avoids 
potential double-taxation of the hub spouse, removes the cumbersome and 
inequitable credits-for-tax-paid scenario, and at the same time, does not 
permit any taxpayer to avoid paying taxes altogether.  
Still, notwithstanding its advantages, this solution also presents 
challenges to the tax system. It clearly does not reflect the economics of 
each polygamous family.
267
 And, while it reduces the tax advantages of 
marrying an additional low-earning spouse, it does not eliminate them. For 
example, though the tax brackets shrink with every additional spouse, an 
additional spouse with little or no income would permit the hub spouse to 
 
 
 266. Rev. Proc. 2013-15 § 2.01, 2013-5 I.R.B. 444 (2013). 
 267. For example, balkanized filing would fail to accurately reflect the structure of a group 
marriage, where every spouse was married to every other spouse. 
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cycle an additional portion of his income through the lowest marginal tax 
rates. 
Balkanized joint filing presents additional complications given the 
polygamous dynamic—most notably, what to do about transfers of 
property between spoke spouses. The tax law disregards transfers of 
property between spouses filing joint returns, because, for tax purposes, if 
married persons file a joint return, income earned or received by either 
spouse goes on the same return and is taxed at the same rate. The same 
presumably would apply to transfers of property between the hub spouse 
and a spoke spouse. But transferring property between spoke spouses 
would change the taxpaying unit responsible for paying taxes on that 
income, and, as such, would present opportunities for tax arbitrage. 
Suppose that Abby held a bond paying $100 of interest annually. Because 
Abby is in the 25-percent tax bracket, she will pay $25 of tax on that 
interest, and will only have $75 of after-tax income. If she could give her 
bond to Dora, the interest would only cause a $10 tax liability, leaving $90 
of after-tax income. Without policing these intrafamilial transfers, a 
polygamous family could significantly reduce its tax liability. 
E. Mandatory Individual Filing 
The fifth potential solution would radically reconfigure the current 
joint filing regime. Rather than trying to shoehorn polygamous spouses 
into the existing dyadic joint filing system, the tax law could shift away 
from joint filing altogether and replace it with mandatory individual filing. 
Mandatory individual tax filing would require each taxpayer, married or 
single, to file a tax return. On that return, she would include her income, 
including, among other things, wage income she earned, gains on the sale 
of her property, and dividends and interest on stocks and bonds she held. 
Based on that return, she would pay taxes, at her own marginal rate, on her 
income. If the tax law moved to a mandatory individual filing regime, all 
of the questions about tax bracket size and the appropriate taxpaying unit 
would become moot, irrespective of an individual‘s marital status. The tax 
law would not devalue polygamous marriage, because it would treat 
polygamous marriage in the same way it treated dyadic marriage. 
Many commentators advocate replacing joint filing with mandatory 
individual filing.
268
 Doing so, they argue, would be better for women, 
would make the income tax fairer between married and unmarried persons, 
 
 
 268. See, e.g., Infanti, supra note 79, at 607; Kahng, supra note 36, at 651; Zelenak, supra note 
67, at 405; Puckett, supra note 38, at 1412; Kornhasuer, supra note 85, at 109. 
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and would not reflect outdated views on family and society. Until now, 
commentators have not justified individual filing by invoking polygamy. 
However, the exercise of trying to fit polygamy into a joint filing system 
lends support to their argument that the joint filing system has become 
inadequate. Through its inability to equitably accommodate polygamous 
marriage within its regime, the joint filing system reveals its decidedly 
dyadic bias—a bias rooted in normative political social engineering, rather 
than pragmatic tax policy. 
Individual tax filing presents a number of advantages over joint filing. 
Individual tax filing would eliminate the secondary-earner problem, 
because each taxpayer would take full advantage of the lower marginal 
rates.
269
 It would not assume an artificial economic unity within all 
marriages,
270
 and would not discriminate between approved economic 
units (e.g., dyadic heterosexual married persons) and unapproved 
economic units, such as domestic partners, cohabitating couples, and other 
non-traditional families.
271
 Moreover, individual filing provides for 
marriage neutrality: because single people and married people would pay 
taxes at the same rates, tax would not factor into the decision to enter into 
or to exit marriage. Additionally, for polygamous families, tax 
considerations would not influence decisions about whether or not to add 
another spouse or what level of income that additional spouse should have.  
Admittedly, replacing the current joint filing system with mandatory 
individual tax filing would hurt some taxpayers. Individual tax filing does 
not treat married persons as an economic unit, in spite of the fact that 
many married people act with some degree of economic unity. To the 
extent that married persons pool their incomes, expenses, and assets, it is 
logical to tax them as a unit, and ignoring their economic unity would tax 
them in a manner that did not reflect the economics of their lives. In 
addition, changing to individual filing would raise the taxes of families 
where one spouse earns significantly more than the other.
272
 
Moreover, even within an individual filing system, the tax law would 
need to acknowledge family relationships for some purposes. A pure 
separate filing regime would ―force couples to commodify the flow of 
 
 
 269. See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text. 
 270. See supra notes 84–85 and accompanying text. 
 271. See supra notes 105–08 and accompanying text. 
 272. Currently, if a couple filing a joint return collectively has taxable income of $100,000, the 
couple owes $16,858 in taxes. Under an individual filing regime, if both spouses had $50,000 of 
taxable income, they would collectively owe the same amount of taxes. If, however, the wife earned 
$100,000 and the husband nothing, they would owe $21,293. See Rev. Proc. 2013-15 § 1.01, 2013-5 
I.R.B. 444 (2013). 
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goods and services within the relationship.‖273 Joint filing allows married 
couples to ignore the informal exchanges that characterize an 
economically interdependent relationship. Requiring a married person to 
keep track of all the services and goods she provides informally to her 
spouse(s) would be extremely time-consuming and burdensome.
274
 
The burden involved in keeping track of these informal flows of 
services and goods extends beyond merely creating a spreadsheet to record 
their value. Not all flows involve transferring a portion of the paycheck, a 
percentage of an asset, or a service with a clear price tag. This lack of a 
clear valuation can create perverse incentives for a married couple where 
the spouses share their income and assets.  
To illustrate these incentives, imagine a married couple that shares all 
of their income and assets evenly. The wife works as an entrepreneur, and 
the husband has left the paid labor market to take care of the couple‘s 
home and children. In a system with mandatory individual filing that did 
not take marriage into account, the tax law would necessarily treat the wife 
as transferring some portion of her income to her husband, in the form of 
food, clothing, and shelter she provided for him, for example.  
Because the tax law treats different kinds of transfers differently, the 
couple would need to characterize the putative transfer. For example, if the 
couple treated the transfer as a gift, it would not constitute gross income to 
the husband, and he would not pay taxes on his receipt of the gift.
275
 But 
treating the transfer of value as a gift potentially creates unfavorable tax 
consequences for the couple. She cannot deduct the value of a gift,
276
 so 
she will pay taxes on the full value of her income. The couple would 
prefer that the husband be taxable on some part of the income, however, 
because he pays taxes at a lower marginal rate than does his wife.  
Moreover, although the husband would not owe taxes on his receipt of 
the gift, her gifts may subject the wife to the gift tax.
277
 The gift tax 
 
 
 273. Motro, supra note 84, at 1536. 
 274. Admittedly, people in committed relationships that are not recognized by the tax law 
currently face these burdens. But the better solution would seem to be expanding the cloak of informal 
exchanges to these relationships rather than eliminating the cloak altogether. Professor Douglas A. 
Kahn proposes doing just that by taxing ―only . . . transactions in which the taxpayer has, either 
voluntarily or involuntarily, entered into a commercial transaction,‖ and ignoring noncommercial 
interactions for tax purposes. Douglas A. Kahn, Exclusion From Income of Compensation for Services 
and Pooling of Labor Occurring in a Noncommercial Setting, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 683, 686 (2011). Of 
course, exempting noncommercial transactions from tax poses a ―difficult question,‖ and one that 
policymakers would have to address. Id. at 687. 
 275. I.R.C. § 102(a) (2006). 
 276. I.R.C. § 262 (2006) (personal, living, and family expenses not deductible). 
 277. See I.R.C. § 2501(a)(1) (2006) (imposition of the gift tax); I.R.C. § 2502(c) (2006) (gift tax 
paid by donor). 
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provides some respite to donors, in the form of an annual exclusion and a 
lifetime exclusion. The wife could give up to $5 million over the course of 
her life free from the gift tax.
278
 But the annual gift tax exclusion is much 
lower—in 2013, just $14,000.279 If, however, she earns $50,000 in a year 
and constructively gives $25,000 to her husband, she would owe a gift tax 
on $11,000 a year, at rates of between eighteen and thirty-five percent.
280
 
Alternatively, the couple could treat the transfer as payment for 
services. Because the tax law treats these payments differently, however, 
they would have to allocate the payments. Perhaps the husband helps his 
wife brainstorm business ideas.
281
 How should the couple value the 
brainstorming services? Under current law, provided her husband‘s 
brainstorming assistance qualifies as a business expense for the wife, she 
will be able to deduct her payments to him.
282
 Assuming he is in a lower 
income tax bracket than she is, and they act as an economic unit, she 
should value his services as highly as she can, because by shifting her 
income to him, they will reduce their collective tax liability.
283
 On the 
other hand, because the wife cannot deduct the value of husband‘s 
cooking, cleaning, or caring for children,
284
 she would be taxed on the 
income when she earned it, and he would be taxed on the portion of the 
income they allocated to cooking, cleaning, and child care.
285
 The couple 
would therefore face incentives to overvalue certain types of services and 
undervalue others, and would need to justify the internal dynamics of their 
marriage to the I.R.S.
286
 
To reflect these dynamics, then, any mandatory individual filing 
regime would necessarily recognize that, in certain circumstances, 
taxpayers act as part of a larger economic unit (to avoid, for example, 
overly onerous recordkeeping requirements and to preserve a level of 
taxpayer privacy).
287
 Discussing the actual details of such a regime goes 
well beyond the scope of this Article, which focuses instead on fairness as 
 
 
 278. I.R.C. § 2505(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2012); I.R.C. § 2010(c) (2006 & Supp. V 2012).  
 279. I.R.C. § 2503(b) (2006); Rev. Proc. 2012-41 § 3.19, 2012-45 I.R.B. 539. 
 280. I.R.C. § 2001(c) (2006 & Supp. V 2012); I.R.C. § 2502(a)(2) (2006 & Supp. V 2012); 
American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, H.R. 8, 112th Cong. § 101(c)(1) (2013). 
 281. See Motro, supra note 84, at 1537. 
 282. I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (2006 & Supp. V 2012). 
 283. See Motro, supra note 84, at 1537–38. 
 284. I.R.C. § 262 (2006). 
 285. Motro, supra note 84, at 1538. 
 286. See id. 
 287. See, e.g., id. at 1540 (―This brings us to the most compelling and internally consistent 
justification—or, to be precise, the true cultural explanation—for income splitting. When husbands 
and wives share income, we are most comfortable viewing each spouse‘s efforts as ‗by and for‘ the 
marital unit.‖). 
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it relates to polygamy, but, nonetheless, the Article will lay out a few 
broad questions an individual filing regime would need to address. 
First, it would need to determine what categories of taxpayers would 
qualify for certain exceptions from pure individual taxpaying permitted by 
the tax law. Different commentators have suggested a range of ways to 
determine the appropriate economic unit. The suggestions range from 
permitting taxpayers to ―identify their economically interdependent 
relationships for themselves‖288 to providing the special rules to all 
―persons who are living together in economically interdependent 
relationships,‖289 from providing some sort of income-splitting solely to 
married persons
290
 to providing this income splitting to all ―economically 
united couples.‖291 
Although any of these proposals could produce fair results, I would 
propose that, at least initially, the special rules apply to relationships 
established under state law that include non-tax obligations. This category 
would include marriage, whether straight or gay, dyadic or polygamous, 
provided the marriage were valid under state law. It would also include 
domestic partnerships and civil unions recognized by a state. This proposal 
would not perfectly map onto the set of economically interdependent 
relationships; particular spouses may not act as an economic unit, while a 
specific cohabitating couple may share all of their income and assets 
equally. But state-sanctioned relationships carry with them costs and 
obligations—people must work to enter the relationship, and have legal 
obligations when it ends. These non-tax costs and obligations provide 
prima facie evidence of a relationship entered into for reasons other than 
(or at least more than) tax purposes, without requiring an invasive inquiry 
into the actual facts of the relationship.
292
 
After determining what relationships will qualify for the exceptions 
from purely individual taxpaying, we must determine what exceptions the 
tax law will permit. For instance, should the tax law permit married 
persons, domestic partners, and couples in civil unions to split their 
 
 
 288. See Infanti, supra note 79, at 646. 
 289. See LAW COMM‘N OF CAN., BEYOND CONJUGALITY: RECOGNIZING AND SUPPORTING CLOSE 
PERSONAL ADULT RELATIONSHIPS 89 (2001), available at http://www.samesexmarriage.ca/docs/ 
beyond_conjugality.pdf. 
 290. See Bittker, supra note 23, at 1421. Professor Bittker was referring solely to dyadic married 
couples, of course, but there is no reason this could not be expanded to polygamous married persons. 
 291. See Motro, supra note 84, at 1559. 
 292. Admittedly, such a standard is both over- and under-inclusive. But no administrable and 
politically-acceptable proposal can perfectly capture just those relationships that are economically 
interdependent without capturing some relationships that are not interdependent or without ignoring 
some that are interdependent. 
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incomes on their separate returns? Doing so would seem to negate the 
purpose behind individual filing by eliminating marriage neutrality. 
On the other hand, permitting members of an economic unit to transfer 
goods or perform services for one another without tax consequences 
would cause individual filing to better comport with taxpayers‘ 
assumptions of economic unity within altruistic relationships. It would 
also eliminate the recordkeeping burden on the taxpayers and eliminate the 
threat of an invasive I.R.S. audit of the internal dynamics of the 
relationship. 
In addition, because each person would file her return and pay taxes 
separately, the tax law would need to provide rules for determining who 
could claim deductions for children and other dependents.
293
 It would need 
to provide rules for determining how to allocate other deductions currently 
available to married persons, especially those relating to shared property 
such as the mortgage interest deduction.
294
 It would also need to determine 
whether a taxpayer who paid a deductible expense on behalf of her spouse 
could take a deduction for such payment.
295
 
Moreover, the tax law would also need to provide anti-abuse rules. 
Under current law, as under the proposed regime, the tax law ignores 
transfers of property between spouses. Under current law, ignoring such 
transfers between spouses filing jointly makes sense: no matter who owns 
the property, they must include any income it produces, or any gains from 
its sale, on their joint return. In a separate return world, however, absent an 
anti-abuse rule, a high-income spouse could transfer income-producing 
property to a low-income spouse and, by doing so, reduce their collective 
 
 
 293. Under current law, if parents are divorced, the parent with whom the child resides for the 
longest period of time can claim the dependency deduction. I.R.C. § 152(c)(4)(B)(i) (2006 & Supp. V 
2012). With separate filing, though, the child could live with both parents for the same amount of time. 
In the case of divorced parents, where a child lives with both parents for the same period of time, the 
parent with the highest adjusted gross income takes the deduction. I.R.C. § 152(c)(4)(B)(ii). That 
would appear to be a good solution in the case of separate filing. 
 294. I.R.C. § 163(h)(2)(D) (2006). Specifically, if the spouses pool their income, and use such 
pooled income to pay the mortgage, should only one spouse take the deduction, should they evenly 
split the deduction, should they split it pro rata according to their income, or should they split it in 
some other manner? Pro rata according to their income would seem to make sense, but the law would 
have to address the question. 
 295. For example, under current law, a taxpayer can deduct medical expenses paid on her own 
behalf or on behalf of her spouse or dependent to the extent those expenses exceed 7.5 percent of her 
adjusted gross income. I.R.C. § 213(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2012). In a separate filing world, Congress 
would need to determine whether she could continue to deduct payments made on behalf of her spouse 
and, if she could, whether payments in excess of 7.5 percent of her adjusted gross income would 
suffice (which could drastically increase the amount of the deductible expense) or whether appropriate 
adjusted gross income would also include her spouse‘s income. 
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tax liability.
296
 They could similarly reduce the tax on capital gains by 
transferring appreciated property from a high-income spouse to a low-
income spouse, or increase the value of loss deductions by doing the 
reverse. In order to prevent this, the tax law would need the ability to 
reallocate some income or gains to the donor spouse. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Although recently polygamy has received increased scholarly attention, 
that attention has largely focused on the questions of whether states should 
decriminalize, or even legalize, polygamous marriage, and how such 
marriage should function. They have largely ignored other law in their 
analysis. Professor Davis has begun to shift the debate, however, to 
second-generation questions about the contours of a legalized polygamy. 
This Article has taken up the essential second-generation question of how 
polygamists should pay taxes. The answer is not obvious, nor should it 
be—polygamous marriage differs both quantitatively and qualitatively 
from dyadic marriage. 
Fundamentally, the current joint filing regime reflects a decidedly 
dyadic bias into which polygamous families do not fit. The tax law treats 
married couples as an appropriate taxpaying unit, but its treatment of 
dyadic married persons provides little insight into the appropriate 
treatment of polygamous married persons. But as soon as the first state 
legalizes polygamous marriage, polygamous families would need to know 
how the tax law applies to them. Before polygamy becomes legal, then, we 
need to determine how polygamists will fit into these legal regimes—or as 
I have shown—how these legal regimes will need to adjust in order to 
accommodate polygamy equitably. In spite of its importance, though, this 
Article is the first to address the appropriate tax treatment of polygamous 
taxpayers. 
Ultimately, the analysis of how the tax law could take account of 
polygamy undermines the basis of the current joint filing regime. While 
there is no single ―correct‖ way to tax married persons,297 joint filing 
appears to be unworkable in a world of expanded familial options. 
Commentators have demonstrated that the joint return makes unwarranted 
assumptions about the economic unity of marriage, that joint filing may 
harm women, and that joint filing is unfair to the many people who cannot 
 
 
 296. Cf. Brunson, supra note 21, at 463. 
 297. Zelenak, supra note 67, at 404–05 (―There is no absolutely right or wrong way to tax married 
couples. A system that is right for one time and place may be wrong for another.‖). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
168 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 91:113 
 
 
 
 
file jointly. This Article goes beyond those objections to demonstrate that, 
in order to accommodate non-dyadic relationships, Congress would need 
to make significant, complex changes to joint filing. And the necessary 
changes may be difficult, if not impossible, to design and implement. 
As a result, the thinking about polygamy adds more weight to the 
argument that the United States should move to mandatory individual tax 
filing, albeit an individual filing that takes account of familial 
relationships. Individual filing removes the need to adjust tax brackets in 
order to achieve horizontal equity and fairness. It eliminates the secondary 
earner problem that polygamy magnifies in any version of joint filing. And 
it eliminates the tax incentive for a family to add more spouses. Still, as 
discussed above, given the importance of marriage and family, even 
mandatory individual filing would necessarily make allowances for 
familial relationships, both in recognition of the unselfish behavior that 
often characterizes family, and in order to provide some amount of 
privacy. 
In spite of the growing evidence in favor of mandatory individual 
filing, however, most commentators believe that the tax law will continue 
to permit married couples to file jointly for at least the near future. To the 
extent Congress has not adopted mandatory individual tax filing when 
polygamy becomes legal, however, the tax law will need a fallback 
position. Of the possible solutions discussed in this paper, balkanized 
filing appears to be the next-best option.  
Ultimately, moving from arguing about the rightness or wrongness of 
polygamy to the second-generation questions of how to implement and 
regulate it provides two significant benefits. First, it provides a more 
fruitful look at polygamy itself, allowing scholars to look clearly and 
carefully at the actual implementation and regulation of polygamous 
relationships. In addition, it presses scholars to reexamine dyadic couples 
with a new perspective. And, just as exploring polygamy provides 
additional support for mandatory individual tax filing, asking the second-
generation questions may also provide further insight on dyadic 
relationships. 
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